

THE
DIFFERENCES
OF THE AGES
OF MANS
Life:

*Together with the Originall
causes, Progresse, and End
thereof.*

Written by the learned HENRY
CVFFE, sometime Fellow of
Merton Colledge in
Oxford.

Ann. Dom. 1600.

Ῥᾶον μωμᾶς ἡ μμῆς.

LONDON
Printed by B. A. and T. F. for Lawrence
Chapman, and are to be sold at his
Shop at Chancery-lane end.
1633.

DIFFER NO. 3



Printed by J. G. & Co. at the
British Museum Press, London.



TO THE RIGHT
HONOV RABLE

and Noble Lord,

ROBERT *Lord Willugbby,*
Beake, and Eresby, in earth the
ground, and in Heaven the
accomplishment of all true
happinesse.

(*)

My very good Lord,

I Doe (not unlike unto Bank-
rupt Debtors) pay what I owe
with another mans Purse.
For which, notwithstanding I
could plead prescription from beyond the

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memory of man, and deduce presidents for
excuse above the low flats of necessitie: The
greatest doe it; why not the meanest? For
the actions of Superiours bee rules of
action unto Inferiours, Et virum mag-
num sequi est penè sapere, as the World
goeth: yet this I dare professe unto your
Honour, the payment is in good and lawfull
money, as good as any that goeth current
with Merchants; and if the triall be true,
by touch or teste, farre beyond the alloy of
ordinary mintage. A coyners it had, whom
Fame had reported (for my selfe did never,
de facie, know him) as skilfull a Master in
this trade, as our shops have brought forth
any. Who though be verified that ancient by-
word, that $\phi\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \mu\alpha\gamma\acute{\alpha}\lambda\alpha\iota$ are $\epsilon\pi\iota\chi\iota\nu\ \delta\upsilon\sigma\iota\tau\epsilon\varsigma$,
yet hath he washed off from the Walls of Ly-
cæum, that blacke aspersiõ of Petronius;
Ego arbitror Adolescentulos in Scholis
stultissimos fieri, quia nihil eorum quæ
in usu habemus, aut audiunt, aut vident.
The Worke carrieth both parts of perfecti-

DEDICATORIE.

on: to Delight, and give Profit. To Delight the affection with pleasing varietie, and indow the mind with excellent formes: which like the two Handmaids of Queene Hester, should sustaine every passage of learning, though it come not to the presence of royall Ahashuerosh. To Profit, by the matter discussed and cleered, which is, in part, the knowledge of our selves, that which the Poet sayd, Came from Heaven, a good meanes to effectuate that, which the Prophet desired; Teach me O Lord to number my dayes, that I may apply my heart unto wisdom. To please in profit, which it selfe is Content; and also in the manner wherein it is carried very perspicuous, and in good method, for which cause I have not added any marginall directions, to stand, as Mercuries statues, in high-ways of old, pointing the finger unto consequents. It came unto my hands, ut è naufragio tabula, and I returne it to your Lordship as Lord of the Soile wheron it

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was cast. For unto your Honour I owe my
selfe both in respect of private service, as
also of that right-worthy house, into which
by marriage your Honour is inserted, whereto
I stand obliged in my best indeavours. You
have it whole and intire, as it came unto my
hands, without any purloining and imbeaxe-
ling, a sincere transcript from the first origi-
nall, which I am informed was his owne; I
durst not adventure, though happily I could,
to adde any thing at all unto that Table,
in which Apelles Pensill had beene. Thus
craving the continuance of your Honorable
respect, and acceptance of my tendred dutie
by proxy, untill my owne meanes doe inable
my sufficienoy, (which hitherto hath beene
nipped in the Bud by the frosts of the Night,
or withered in the blade for want of moy-
sture) I thrice humbly take my leave,
and rest your Honors

L DE 60

In all Services,

R. M.



The Preface.



The Learned *Heraclete* no lesse elegant than Enigmaticall, among other his quaint speeches, hath this saying of speciall remembrance and observation: That the greedy Mettall-mongers, in their too eager search for the measured Worlds wealth, after long toyle and trouble, finde *parvum in magno*, a little pure substance in a great deale of unprofitable earth. Contrarily it fareth in the inquisition and pursuit of *Learning*, where
we

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we often finde with a little abstractive speculation, *magnū in parvo*, much matter in few words, every short golden Sentence and Particle thereof, contrayning incredible store of most pure substance. For as the cunning *Cosmographers*, draw the whole compasse of the wide *World*, into the narrow precincts of a small *Mappe*; so have our learned *Artists* contracted the unconceivable amplitude of the *Liberall Sciences*, into volumes of small quantity. But as gold, the purest of all Mettals, howsoever couched in a little compasse, is many times beaten out into a marvellous amplitude; so the short *Aphorismes* of *Philosophie*, in the circuit of a small period, comprehend substance sufficient to fill whole volumes. Which truth is confirmed, or rather manifested by the present matter we intreat of, whereby, as *Pythagoras* finding the print of *Hercules* his foot, gessed thereby at the proportion

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portion of his whole body; so wee by the view of this so little and neglected a peece of *Philosophy*, may gather what we are to thinke of the whole body (that I may so speake) of *Learning*. Which I observe the rather, because I see many shallow headed Artificers oftentimes condemne us of folly, that spend our whole *Life* in the study of good *Letters*, and yet (such is our grosse conceit) wee never come to the requisite perfection of *Knowledge*. As if our *Arts* were like the Mechanicall Sciences of base Prentises, that may bee thoroughly learned in the compasse of Seauen yeeres. It was well sayd of one, *Ardua longa, vita brevis*, wee haue a great taske, and a short time. I have read of some who in the compasse of three yeares, have sayled about the World, but I never yet heard of any who in the whole course of his life, how laboriously soever passed ouer, was
able

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able to compasse the whole *Circle* of *Sciences*. And therefore *Theophrastes*, a learned *Philosopher* lying on his death-bed, accused *Nature* of unkindnesse or rather want of discretion, that so inconsiderately doth bestow the inestimable benefit of long life upon brute Beastes and sensible Creatures, that can neyther acknowledge so high a favour, nor by their length of dayes benefit themselves and others; but man that might in time restore decayed nature by perfecting the imperfect Arts, hath his induring but as a moment: implying that the whole course of a mans life, was not time sufficient to worke perfection in. And therefore, well sayd *Sigismund* the *Emperour* to a *Doctor of Law*, whom for an excellent *Stratagem* against the Enemy he had Knighted not long before, when at an Assembly of *Peeres* and *Counsellors*, the *Doctor* doubted to whether company he might with greatest credit ioyne him-

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himselfe, *Is it doubtfull*, sayd the Empe-
rour, *whether learning or military experi-
ence is more honourable? I can in one day
make a thousand good Souldiers; but I am
not able in a thousand yeares to make one
tolerable Doctor.* So that it is no mar-
vell though *Socrates*, after his long time
of life, yet on his death-bed confessed
he had many things to learne. And we
thinketh these nimble witted Trades-
men, doe not so much magnifie theyr
owne quicke conceit, as publish the fa-
cility of their Sciences. For as *Apelles*
said well unto a *Painter* that bragged of
his speedy workmanship, when shew-
ing his picture he said, *This I drew even
now.* Surely, said *Apelles*, *though thou
hadst said nothing, yet should I easily have
guessed by the workmanship, that it was
done in haste.* So may we well say to
these quick-witted Mechanicall Trades-
men, a man that hath but a little insight
into theyr Trade, may well thinke their
Craft

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Crafts are soone learned : and I rather marvell, (as *Apelles* sayd) that they learned no more in the same quantity and length of time. But it fareth with their grosse phantasie as it doth with our eye-sight in an unequall distance from the obiect: for as being farre off we conceiue of the unmeasurable greatnessse of the most huge hilles to be but as a point: so the infinite excellencies of the heavenly *Arts*, being too far removed from their grosse, or rather narrow capacity, come into their conceit as things of lesse moment: which if their dimme or rather weake eye-sight were able to behold in their divine Nature, they would soone confesse their surpassing excellency, and exceeding difficulty. But to leave them to their pleasing opinions, and to come to our purpose, which is, in brieft to handle the differences of the *Ages of Mans Life*, as also the *Causes* thereof, together with the incident

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dent *Qualities* to every of them, which being in some sort availeable to the *knowledge* of our selves, the highest point of knowledge which can be attained unto, by the judgment of the wise *Apollo*, as also cyther altogether omitted, or very slightly handled by others, I hope my small paines and lesse ability shall be accepted in good worth and accounted of, rather according to the good intent of the Author, than the worthinesse of the Worke. In which hope of acceptation for my good endeavors, and favourable pardon of my manifold errors, I come without any longer Preface to the substance of the
Treatise.

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1. DE GO



THE DIFFERENCES
of the Ages of mans
 Life.

*Together with the originall causes,
 progresse, and end
 thereof.*



AN the *Epitome* of the
 whole *World*, Lord of the
Creatures, in regard of that
 perfect Analogie and re-
 semblance betweene him
 & the great worlds frame,
 is not vnfitly by the Learned, both *Divines*
 and *Philosophers*, termed, The *Lesser World*:
 for there is nothing in the vast compasse of
 this universall circumference, whole like-
 nesse and lively representation we have not
 summarily

summarily comprised in man, as in a most perfect compendium and abridgement. For as the *first moved sphere* carrieth with its motion, the subiect inferiour *circles*; so the servile vnderfaculties, as the *sensuall desire* & *appetite*, are by *nature* subdued to the dominion and guidance of the more principall and mistris power of the soule, which wee call *reason*. And as in the middest of heaven there is scituated the *Sunne* that enlightheth all things with his rayes, and cherisheth the world, & the things therein contained with his life-keeping *heat*: so the heart of man, the fountaine of *life* and *heat*, hath assigned to it by *Nature*, the middle part of our body for his habitation, from whence proceedeth *life* and *heat*, unto all the parts of the body, (as it were unto Rivers) whereby they be preserved and inabled to performe their naturall and proper functions. But not to be infinite in prosecuting the particulars of this well knowne comparison, as in other things we see a perfect proportion, so also, beside the *analogie* we may observe a mutual *coexistence*. For as the *world* at the beginning was created for *man*, so with *man* it shal also be abolished: for it is an undenyable principle in *Philosophy*, that *God* and *Nature*,

or rather the *God of Nature* neyther effectually
worketh, nor permissively suffereth anything,
but unto some good end. For being infinitely
wise, nay *Wisedome* it selfe, how can we ima-
gine so high a point of folly, resident in his
Godhead, as to allow of *vauities*, things so
hatefull, and so abhorring from all medio-
crity of wisedome? Wherefore man having
a determinate date of endurance which hee
cannot passe, the *world* also, which is onely
for mans use and seruice, must of necessity
have an end of being. Now because there is
(as we sayd) a mutuall coexistence of the
world and man, as the world is not but for
man, so neyther is man, but in and by the
world. For as in *Navigation*, those that are
in the *ship*, haue rest and motion with the
moving & cessation of the *ship*, so we that are
tossed in the rough sea of this *World*, in our
voyage unto *heaven* our safest haven, when
our vessell of carriage once perisheth, we also
perish together. For as *Aristotle* said truly,
that *whatsoever hath being, hath of necessity be-
ing in some place*; so from thence ariseth this
necessary illation, that when there is once
left no place to be in, then shall there remaine
no longer being. So that intending to shew
this truth as very pertinent to our purpose,

viz, that man hath an appointed time of being, which he cannot passe, the Question of the Worlds eternitie is fitly incident, especially, seeing, as is aforesayd the world is for mans sake, and man by meanes of the world.

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Now if any man shall call into question, the pertinency of this question, for his satisfaction and resolution in that behalfe, let him consider how necessarily upon the variation of our *temperature* (whence the distinction of ages proceedeth) a finall destruction, by an vnperceivable lingring decay of purity in our substance, doth depend. For as in the violent motion of things *naturall*, we see it comes to passe, that the *vertue* or *power* of moving, imprinted by the *unnaturall motion*, by little and little decaying, at length by continuance of moving, or rather by the resistance of the bodies about it, is cleane extinguished: So in the naturall proceeding toward the enemy and end of *nature*, *Death* the preserving meanes of life (eyther by the toylefomnesse of their never-ceasing operation, or by the corruption and mixture of impure moysture, infeeble and disabled to the sufficient performance of theyr functions, more and more every day) at length of force yeelds to the oppressing violence of theyr

theyr resisting aduersaries, not able any longer to maintaine their conquering action, so that the discussing of this controversie it very homogeneous to the series of this Treatise. For till there be granted an end of mans life, the mutation of the temperature by decay of nature may well be doubted of, forasmuch as a successive impaying away importeth a small dissolution.

First therefore, touching the continuance of the world, whether as it had a beginning, so it shall have an end, or rather whether it ever had beginning, or shall have an end of being. *Dionysius* in his booke *de Divinis nominibus*, distinguisheth things that are, according to the difference of their indurance, the distinction is after this sort. The whole number of things, how many and divers soever, may be summarily comprised under these three severall heads. There are some things, or rather there is one thing *Eternall*, which neyther had beginning nor shall have end, and such is *God* alone, who onely being immutable, subject to none, no not the least alteration, is therefore only from everlasting to everlasting, for that cause termed in holy writ, the *ancient of dayes*: amongst the old *Egyptians* resembled to a decrepu-old-man,

and pourtrayed like a *youth* in the prime of his flourishing yeares; by that first *Image* signifying his long continuance from before, by the second, his liveliness and immunity from all manner defect and alteration by cancred corrupting time. For as his power is infinite, extended not onely to all things in the world, but even unto things which are not: as first, he made all things of nothing, as his greatness is unmeasurable, not limited or bounded by any place or compass, and therefore sayd to have his *centrum ubique*, from which the *essence* of all things is drawne, as *lines*, and where they end and are all conjoynd, & his *circumference no Where*; finally, as all his attributes are *infinite*, and immeasurable, so is his countenance altogether boundlesse. Wherefore not to enter at all into this inextricable *Labyrinth* of Gods infinite continuance, let us proceed unto the next part of the distinction. Beside God, who is onely *Eternall*, there are other things in a middle degree, termed by the moderne *Philosophers*, *Eviternall*, having *beginning* from God, the fountaine of being, yet without end, either of *annihilation*, or *corruption*; such are all spirituall creatures, *Angels*, and the *Soules* of men. Where notwithstanding there

there is a doubt to be answered: For in the whole *Historie* of the *Creation* recorded by *Moses*, we find no mention of the making of Angels, nor any word of them till the narration of the *Womans* treacherous seduction by the *düvel* in the *serpent*, so that either they were not created, and so were from everlasting, or else, *Moses* his *Chronicle* is in this point defective. But we may well answer, that they had a beginning, seeing that eterni-ty is *Gods* peculiar attribute, and the same, though inclusively, expressed by *Moses* in his booke of *beginnings*: for by Heaven is signified, not onely the body of heaven, but the things also therein containd. Now of the indirect, and inclusive mention made of these admirable creatures, there may this reason be given: The men of those times being very superstitious, and given vnto Idolatry, (for the *Egyptians* euen at that time worshipped the *Sunne*, & the *hosts of heauen*) *Moses* fearing to give new occasion to their false *Will-worship*, of purpose refrained from expresse mentioning of their names, or natures in his *history*. For if these bodily visible creatures, wrung from them such di-
vine worship, the *Angels*, by how much more excellent theyr nature is, would haue so

much the more added new fewell to theyr begun fire of superstition: Secondly, lest the detractory Nature of corrupted man, should have ascribed some part of the glory of the worlds creation to those heavenly creatures the wise pen-man of this excellent story of purpose concealed what he knew eyther of their *Creation* or Nature: so that *Moses* his history is in this regard not defective, howsoever giving no expresse notion of the creation of *Angels*. Neither are the *Angels* though most excellent creatures, voyde of beginning, there being but one thing, which one made all things, of it selfe, *eternal*. The third degree is of those things that had both beginning with *time*, and shall have their end in *time*; such are all bodily creatures as well simple as mixt, although touching the celestiall bodies there be some doubt.

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Now as concerning the *world*, the question is, to which of these three kinds, it may and ought to be referred. And I finde three severall opinions. The first is, of them that make the *world* *eternal*, wanting *beginning*, and incapable of *end*. The second, of them that grant both *beginning* and *end of being*. There is a third Sect that parts these two opinions, affirming, that it had a *beginning*,
and

and shall have no *end*. But lest wee sticke in the words, let us in one word or two, set downe the sense and meaning of the *Question*: and because that *error* is the child of *confusion*, distinguish the things doubtfull, lest through the equivocation of the words, by mistaking, we come unto a contrary sense. By the *world* therefore, sometime is meant the whole compasse of things that are, as well spirituall as bodily, extended in this sence even unto God himselfe. Secondly, it is taken for all things, only *God* excepted, even the whole worke of the *Creation*, excluding no creature how excellent soever, no not the *Angels*. Thirdly, it signifieth onely the circuit of bodily *creatures*, whether you interpret bodily things to be such as have bodies as parts of them, or such as, though in regard of composition have no bodies. yet have theyr being onely in creatures bodily, as those things which we call *Accidents*. For the first acception it cōcerneth not our purpose. For *Nature* it selfe excludeth *God* from all kinde of *beginning*, and it is a principle both in reason, and in religion, that *God* is *from everlasting*. In the second sence wee may take it, comprehending all things both spirituall and bodily: for even the *Angels*, as

is before sayd, had their *beginning* by *creation*: but we rather hold our selves unto the last signification, as being most usually meant by those that handle this controversie. And this also according to its threefold consideration, hath three severall acceptations. For first, it is taken for that *Idea* & type preconceived of the *Maker God*, by which he was ruled and directed in the building thereof. And this is termed by *Plato*, the *Ideal* or *exemplary world*, as it were the *copie* which *God* followed in the *Creation*: whereby if he understand *Gods decree* to create, we may without error entertain it; otherwise it is somewhat harsh: for we are not to imagine that *God* needeth any long premeditate or fore-conceived type of his workes, as our finite artificers do, but as his wisdom, and power is infinite, so doth hee, in an vnutterable manner at the same moment, devise the manner and performe the worke, and yet, not rashly, but most wisely, and with great deliberation. For as he said in another sense, so may I say in this case, *One day with God, is as a thousand yeares, and a thousand yeares as one day*; length of time adding nothing to his ability and wisdom, nor fewnesse of dayes, any way detracting from the perfection

on

on of his workmanship. Secondly, it is taken for the *university* of things containd within the compasse and cope of heaven and earth, now really and actually subsisting; and this is called of *Plato*, the *world reall*, as having an actuall and externall being in *Nature*, not onely in conceit and intention. Thirdly, man is called the *lesser world*, in regard of that perfect analogie and similitude, betwixt him and this greater world, wherein there is nothing whose likenesse and resemblance may not be seene in man: and this you may call the *Analogicall world*; Now by the world in our question, we principally vnderstand, the frame of all things in heaven and in earth: lesse principally *Man*, as being but a part thereof. As for the other terme, namely *Eternall*, that also hath two acceptions; for things are sayd to be *Eternall* two wayes: First improperly, that which never shall have end, more fitly called *Everternall* or *immortall*. Properly that is sayd to be *Eternall*, which neither had beginning; nor shall have end, nor as *Boethius* addeth, any *succession*. Now *Eternall*, we take in the more proper and latter sense. So that the *Question* may thus more plainly be expressed, *Whether the heaven and earth. with the body*

bodily Creatures therein containd, had a beginning, or shall have an end of being.

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But because that part of the opinion which concerneth the worlds eternity, *a parte ante*, as the Schoole-men speake; that is, its being from everlasting, is not so directly pertinent unto our purpose, we will with all possible brevitie, runne over the speciall reasons, and foundations thereof, the rather because the Authors and maintayners thereof from the want of *beginning*, inferre the uncapablenesse of an *end*. Now the chiefe Patron and defender of this opinion in regard of authoritie, though not of time, was *Aristotle*, who, as I take it, rather affecting singularity, than for any soundnesse of the matter or strength of Argument, taught it in his *Licæum*. For the *Philosophers* which lived before him, with generall consent agreed in the contrary opinion: *Trismegistus*, who with his Learning watered the then barren Country of Greece, as *Diodorus Siculus* witnesseth in his first Booke of *Antiquities*, *Musæus*, *Orpheus*, *Linus*, *Epicharmus*, *Hesiodus*, and *Homer*, amongst the Poets; *Zoroastes*, *Anaxagoras*, *Melissus*, *Empedocles*, *Pherecides*, *Philolaus*, *Democritus*, and *Plato*, as *Philolaus*

dans, *Laertius Diogenes*, *Sulpitius Severus*, *Alexander Aphrodisiensis*, *Plutarch*, and *Tully* witnesse, which also his bookes intituled *Timans*, and *Critias*, together with those *De Republica* doe testifie. Onely *Aristotle* in a selfe-conceit of singularity, howsoever elsewhere honouring antiquity, rather liketh in this case a new broched opinion of his owne, contrary to so many foregoing *Philosophers*: and therefore *Hierophantes*, a devout, though Idolatrous Priest, condemned him of arrogancie, and selfe-love, not onely because, contrary to the common received opinion of his Countrey, continued so many ages vngainsayed, hee denied the plurality of Gods, but also, and much more for that he stucke not to teach, that the world was from everlasting, which all Greece confessed to have had beginning in time.

But to fetch the beginning of this phantasticall opinion somewhat higher: we will beginne with *Democritus*, the Archpatron of *Fortune*, who will have the World Eternall, and withall chanceable: But Eternitie and Chance, being (as the learned Sir *Philip* observed) things unsufferable together; If Chanceable, then not-Eternall. Againe,
what

what is more absurd then to thinke the World was made by the untended, and casuall concourse of indivisible substances? for whence came these substances? If you say they came from *Everlasting*, & so were Eternall, can you conceive such chanceable effects to proceed from so certaine & necessary causes? Nay rather, if you wil needs maintain the infinitenes of these diminutive bodies, grant they had beginning from that Infinite One that glued the Infinite parts of your *Infinite*. *All*, together, by his unmeasurable *Power* and *Wisedome*. For can we imagine such a perfect *Order* and *Stabilitie* to consist in these disioyned substances? *Order* and *Constancy* are children onely of *Wisedome*: & sooner may we prove *Darknesse* to proceed from the *Sunne*, than *Constancie* and *Order* from inconstant chance, constant in nothing but in *Inconstancy*. Finally, we must eyther exclude Gods *Wisedome* and provident care of the *World* made, or else *Fortune* from making of the *World*: (for the *World* is Gods possession, onely by right of *Creation*) unlesse we imagine a deed of gift passed by *Fortune* at her death: or *Fortune* the true *Owner* (if the true *Maker*) disinherited, & by violence driven out of her dominion by
 God

God asan *Usurper*. But God having nothing to plead for his title unto his kingdome, but the right of *Creation*, if that plea be improoved, God cannot any longer call the *World* his owne, and therefore without cruelty may cast off all care of this his supposed offspring. For it is onely Gods *Fatherhood* that bindes him unto his *Providence*.

Therefore not to stay long in this opinion of *Fortune*, let us now come unto *Nature*, deified especially by *Strato* a *Naturalist*: who fearing to over sway God with the weight of this burthen, eyther in the making, or governing of the *World*, hath granted him a *Remedie*, or *Otium* as they terme it, thinking it more reason that God should have an exemption from trouble, than Gods *Priests*, who for his sake be dispensed withall. But let us see, what this *Nature* may bee, so highly by *Strato* magnified. There is a *particular Nature*, and there is a *generall* or *uniuersall Nature*. The particular is, that which in every severall single *substance*, ministreth *Essence* to the whole *compound*: and withall, is *author* of such action, and *motion*, as is agreeable to the subiect wherein it is, as the *Nature* of *fire*, causeth the *fires* ascention, the *Nature* of *earth*, the
carbs

earths going downward: and in regard of this *Nature*, we say it is *Naturall* to the fire to ascend, to the *earth* to descend, the bodies having in them, even of themselves, by their inherent forme a promptnesse, and inclination unto these motions. Now if by the conspiring of these many and manifold *Natures*, this *All*, we now speake of, were made, as if the *Elements*, & *Ethereall* parts should in their *town-house* set downe the bounds of every ones office; then consider what followeth, that there must needs have beene, a wisdom ouerruling power, which made them concur: for their natures being so diuers and contrary would rather haue wrought each others destruction, than so friendly haue comforted, to make up so unexpressable an harmony. For, to grant *knowledge* unto them whereby to moderate the extremity of their naturall fury, or intendment of such agreement, were to enter into a bottomlesse pit of absurdities, seeing that *knowledge* alway presupposeth *reason*, & *reason* sense: both which are neuer found, eyther joyntly, or in part, in bodily senselesse creatures. Now touching the *Vniuersall Nature*, which some will haue to be nothing, but an *influent* *virtue* helping & furthering the actions of every particular na-

tural

turall body, others, an *Univerſall overruling*, and as it were, an *Ideal Nature ſubſiſting*. For as the particular nature of every particular body, cauſeth and maintaineth the particular *actions* of the body wherein it is ; ſo this generall Nature is the Author and maintainer of all *actions* and *bodies* ; to which, the ſingle ſeverall bodies are in ſubjection, by their obedience, acknowledging a kinde of ſuperiority, in that nature which we call *univerſall*. And in the reſpect of this Nature, the fire is ſayd, in ſome caſes, to goe downward by Nature, as to hinder the *diſcontinuitie* of things in the world, and ſo, that *emptines* which nature ſo much abhorreth. Now, if by this vniuerſall nature, they underſtand a nature of *Wiſedome*, and *goodneſſe*, and *providence*, which with *knowledge* performeth its actions, and ſo of purpoſe, & deliberately hath knit together theſe ſo many points to ſuch an excellent *unitie*, this Nature we reject not, but retaine, as that *God* and *Maker* of all things, that by his infinite irreſiſtable power hath conioyned the diſagreeing parts of this viſible world, and of things contrary made a perfect harmony, permitting in their nature a mutuall reſiſtance ; yet ſo, as they hinder not their friendly copulation

tion in the worlds composition. In sum, touching *Nature* and *Fortune*, they are thus onely (sayth *Scaliger*) to be interpreted: that *Nature* signifies Gods ordinary power; and thus, things extraordinary may be called *unnaturall*: *Fortune* his vnrevealed will, and thus may we call things *chanceable*, that are beside *expectation*, or beyond *reason*.

8

Now touching the *Epicure*, who (as *Tully* sayth) derived his opinion from *Democritus*, we will in one word answer his reason, recorded by *Tully* in his second booke *de Natura Deorum*, and so come unto *Aristotle*, and his Scholler the Atheist. The *Epicures* reason is briefly thus propounded by way of interrogation: What eyes (sayth he in his scoffing impudency) had *Plato*, to behold the framing of this so great a worke? Or what tooles, and fellow-workemen had *God* to make the *World* withall? The answer is, that *Plato* his eye, was the eie of *reason*, gathering by necessary consequence, both the being of the Deity, as also confusedly apprehending the infinitenesse of *God* his power and *Wisdom* shining in the *World*, as in a most cleere glasse reflecting in some sort, the Image of Gods invisible *Nature*, upon the eyes of all the beholders. Touching absence of instruments
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and fellow-workemen, whereby the *Epicure* would inferre the impossibility to create in *God*, we are not to thinke that *God*, infinite in power, is tyed to the helpe of secundary instrumentall causes, they being but supplyes of defects, and helps of wants, in the otherwise insufficient agents: and therefore not requisite, to the eternall infinitenesse of *Gods* ability. Nay we may adde further, which is *Gods* priviledge, *God* of nothing, is powerfull enough to make all things, much more without instruments. Now a possibility of creating in *God*, may thus brietly be shewne according to the manner of being of every thing, so also is the order of working; but *Gods* being and beginning dependeth upon nothing but himselfe: why then should it be thought impossible, that *Gods* action is not tyed unto any matter? And indeed, the reason (as far as I can perceive) why other things require a subiect whereon to worke, is onely the impotency of the *Agents*, but *God* Al-sufficient, and powerfull, who can out of the *Rocks* bring water, out of darknesse light, can also (as he hath done) make all things of nothing. An other reason may be this, taken from the difference of the principall efficientes, *God*, *Nature*, *Art*. *Art*, alway presupposeth a thing

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thing really and perfectly subsisting; Nature onely a matter with a power to be God (a farre more powerfull *Agent* then eyther *Art* or *Nature*) is able, of that which is nothing at all, to make a thing of actuall and reall subsistence. For, if *Nature* can of a thing in the lowest degree of being, and next to a not being, make a thing actually subsisting, God All-sufficient, and infinite in power, can of nothing create any thing in what degree of being soever.

9

Now touching the Atheist, out of *Aristotle* his *Philosophie* he hath drawne this subtile *Interrogatorie*, which hee propoundeth with so unfavory scorne: If the world were not from Euerlasting. but made by the God you talke of, I would know of you, where he lived before the time that hee made the world; how he busied himselfe all the time before? for it is an absurdity, even among us, to say, he was idle: as also what he did, if he did not make it from everlasting? Touching the place of his being, and the manner of his work, I may not unfitly answer, as a learned Father of the *Primitive Church* did unto the same demand; He was in a Wood providing se well for that fire, which should in bellis torment such curious priors into matters beyond their

their reach. But for his *location*, I may thus more fitly answer: that God is tyed to no *place*, being in all *places* to fill them with his *goodnesse*, in no *place* to be circumscribed by the *circumference*. Touching his action we answer, that howsoever the externall work, (the after-fruit of his external working) had no externall sensible being, yet was hee not unoccupied, his very decreeing being an action, and that also having relation unto the creatures, which should afterward have being. The *Hibrewes* (who many times do but trifle in matters of weight) give unto this frivolous question, as frivolous an answer, saying, that God to keepe himselfe unoccupied, spent that time in trifling experiments, now making a world on this fashion, now on that, then by and by dissolving his loose and displeasing worke; at length by many trials, to have light upon this *world*, & this *fashion*, which for his conceived liking, he established. But these learned *Rabbins*, meant a more serious matter then their words beare shew of: and that was, that God did not rashly, nor without great deliberation make the world on this fashion rather than any other, and that he saw he might have made it many other wayes, and sooner, and

more worlds, but would not : alluding, as I take it, to *Gods* counsell-taking, at the decree, touching the time and manner of the worlds creation, which was the sum of our first given answer. But more soundly and to the purpose we answer, that the actions of the *Deity* are of two sorts, *immanent* & *inter-nall* : or *externall* and *transcunt* : the *immanent* actions are those which bee in the *Deitie* from one *person* unto another, as to love together, and such like : the *transcunt* actions are those that passe from the *Godhead*, to some *externall* object : they may both bee thus illustrated. As in the element of *fire* there is a faculty of heating and enlightning, whence proceedeth heat and light unto the *externall* neere bodyes, and beside this faculty there is also in it a naturall power to go upward, which when it commeth into *act*, is received in no other subiect but the *fire* it selfe : so that, if *fire* could by abstractive imagination be conceived of, as wanting these two *transcunt* operations, yet could we not iustly say it had no *action*, forasmuch as it might mooue upward, which is an *immanent* an *inward* action. So, and much more so, though we grant that there was no *externall* worke of the *Godhead*, vn-
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till the making of the world, yet can there be no necessary illation of *Idleness*, seeing it might have, (as indeed it had) actions immanent included in the circle of the Trinity. Againe, thus reason these blasphemous Atheists against the truth: If for mans sake *God* made the world, and all things therein, how cometh it to passe, that there are in the world so many noisome creatures, as *Vipers* and such like, which procure rather our annoyance, than serve any way for our use and benefit? For to say they are chanceable or of a voluntary & selfe procreation, is (in our Philosophy) absurd, especially, seeing we extend *Gods power*, and *providence* vnto very *flies*, and such like creatures. But we may answer, first that there is nothing so cumbersome, which is not someway serviceable. Or, if now disobedient, yet not so created, but, for mans rebellion against *God*, permitted or rather directed to arme themselves against him, for whose use and helpe they were created: like unto that sword, which *Hector* gave *Ajax*, which so long as he used against men his enemies, serued for his helpe and defence; but after that he began to use it, or rather to abuse it, to the hurt of hurtlesse beasts, it turned into his owne bowels. For

untill the transgression; *Adam* lived as Lord of the creatures, hauing now the most dangerous and pernicious creatures under him, in subiection. For the diuell, that subtle Seducer, was not so simple a sot, as to make choice of the serpent to beguile him with inticements if he had knowne, or but suspected any resident feare in man of the serpent, by some foregoing remembred mischiefe; for that had beene rather to terrifie him from all attention, then any way to allure him to follow his counsell. So that, all things which now are unto corrupted man most cumbersome, as punishments of his disloyalty, were by creation ordained for his furtherance. Nor need they wonder, that *Gods* power and knowledge should stretch it selfe vnto flies and such diminitive Creatures, as they tearme them: nay it is far more insensible, that the estate of flies should be unknowne unto him, for that were to bound the infinitnesse of his knowledge.

10

But to leave the professed Atheist, who though from *Aristotle* his Schoole he sucked his noisome error, yet went far beyond *Aristotle* in impiety: For *Aristotle* (at least in words) confessed Gods being, an infinitenes, which also he went about to prove and confirme

confirme by reason, whereas these godlesse Heretikes do not onely deny both in theyr works, and by consequence of words, but even shamelesly with direct speeches, not only his *omnipotency*, but even his very *being*: let us therefore come to *Aristotle* and his lesleprophane followers. The *Peripateticks* principall and most subtile argument, which also they vrge with greatest vehemency is briefly this; say they, eyther the world was from everlasting, or else made anew, proceeding from not being, unto this being which now it hath. But it was not made a new; for then, eyther it proceeded from a power and fitnessse which it had to bee unto this actuall being, or else it was made of nothing. If before it was actually subsisting, it had a being potentiall from everlasting (seeing things that are potentially, though in the basest degree of being, yet are not meerely nothing) it followeth, that it alwayes was (at least potentially) and so eternall. If we say that it was made of nothing, that is (in their Philosophy) an absurd impossibility. For it is with them a principle not questionable, *That every making presupposeth a Subject.* Now if we object, that the necessary presence of a reall subject dependeth only upon
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the Makers infirmity, and imperfection: they answer, *that* the disability of doing impossibilities is not defect or imbecility. To which sayd argument of theirs (as they would have it) there may bee a double answer given. For first, we affirme that the world proceeded, from not being to being. To the proposition of their prosyllogisme we answer by deniall therof, and reiect their distinction as sophisticall, putting contrariety (the greatest opposition) betwixt things, not onely agreeing, but even all one. For there is a potentiall being, incident to things that are not at all, and therefore doe the Schoolemen distinguish of the potentiall being after this manner: A thing (say they) may be sayd to have a potentiall being two wayes: first, that is sayd to be potentially which is not yet, eyther in whole, or in part subsisting in nature, which having no reall, or actuall cause of being, may notwithstanding afterward haue a true cause of its essence and existence. So that it is not any thing, in, or of it selfe, but is virtually containd within the ability of some thing, that may afterward bring it unto a true and reall being. As for example, there is a potentiall being of more worlds then one, inasmuch as
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God by his unresistable, undecayed power, is able, as well to make more worlds, as he was to create this one world which wee behold and inhabite: yet, who will say, that there are more worlds than one, eyther totally or partially, really and truly now being in nature? Indeed it is a thing within the compasse of Gods omnipotency, to bring in a multiplicity of worlds, and therefore we may not untruly say, that this multiplicity of worlds hath a being potentiall. So likewise, who will deny, that a man sound and without maime or lacke of his limmes, that never set foot over his threshold, hath power (with supposition of health and strength) to travell over the whole circuit of the countrey; yet is it absurd to say, that this journey of his, is any way in nature, eyther wholly or in part. Secondly, that may iustly and is more properly sayd; to be potentially, that having an actuall and reall subsisting, even seperate from it efficient cause, wherein it was before virtually containd, yet lacketh somewhat, which by nature it is capable of. As for instance hereof, a child altogether unlettered, may iustly be sayd to be potentially disposed toward the receipt of Learning, inasmuch as it hath a reasonable Soule,

soule, which is alway accompanied with a capacity of learning. To apply this distinction unto our purpose, we say that to bee potentially in the first degree, is indeed to be nothing; because this potentiall being is a meere not being: & so was the world from everlasting, having such an ability and capableness (that I may so speake) of being, forasmuch as God by his omnipotency was from everlasting powerfull enough to create the world, as in time hee did actually make the same. Now for that other kinde of potentiall being, incident unto things onely that have received an actuall being from their causes, it was in that rude *Chaos* created by God, the first day of the begun-making of the world, and was afterward perfected in the worke of distinction (as the Schoole-men call it) when God out of that confusion, or rather upon that rude lump, brought this admirable variety and difference of creatures, for the ornament of the world: for that the world was in this sort potentially onely at the creation of the first matter, which was in the time by *Moses* mentioned. Secondly we answer, that it is not impossible for God of nothing to make things really and truly subsisting, as we before

fore proved. To their *Axiome* or principle, which they call Vndeniable, we answer, that there is a two-fold faction or making : One naturall, incident to Creatures, commonly called Generation; the other supernaturall, the priuiledge of God himselfe, which we terme Creation. Now every making which is a Generation, requireth a really-being subiect, because it is eyther a motion or mutation which supposeth a matter wherein it is received : but the making of Creation, is alway without any matter subiect, being defined to be, *A making something of nothing.* But these aduersaries admit of no such duplicity of making, holding it a meere impossibility, for any Agent in this sort to create : Thus therefore somewhat otherwise we answer : There be two sorts of Agents or Efficientes, the one Vniuersall, the other Particular or Partiall. They differ thus : That the Efficient vniuersall is cause of the whole being and essence of it effect, making both matter and forme; and this action of this Agent, is not Motion or Mutation, but a bare Emanation. The particular Agent is not cause of the whole essence of that it maketh: seeing it alway requireth the preexistence of the matter, and the action thereof

is truly called Motion or Mutation. So then it is impossible for a partiall or halfe efficient (as you may terme him) to worke or make a thing of nothing; but for an universall, it is not onely possible, but even easie. And is it not (thinke you, to answer euery poynt of theyr reason) and infirmity in the Maker, not to bee able to make a thing without matter? for why is the existence of the matter necessary, but because the efficient can doe nothing: and doth not this import a defect of the workmans ability? No, say the adversaries, for it is no imperfection to be unable to doe things impossible: but we deny that this is impossible unto any, but unto particular agents naturall; as for God to whom nothing is impossible (but to deny himselfe) as he is the whole and sole cause of being, so is he able even from a not being, to bring things to the highest and most excellent degree of being. Secondly, say they, unlesse we grant an ever-beeing of motion, we must needs admit eyther of a proceeding *in infinitum*, or else of this senselesse contradiction, that before the first motion there was a motion more ancient; two maine absurdities, the one in reason, the other in Nature. For the progresse *in infinitum*,

tum, they thinke it is thus proved ; for before the motion, whereby the first moved body was made, there was of necessity requisite some potentiall being thing, because that motion is onely incident unto things of a potentiall existence. If that bee granted , then they inferre that there was some motion whereby this subject had it being, and so in infinitum. But to stop theyr long iourney, we may hinder this infinite proceeding by granting a Creation. It is true indeed, that there must needs bee a thing capable of motion before there can be any mooving : for in every motion there is a thing mooving , and a thing mooved ; but there is no necessity that this mooveable should have its being by motion ; for it was made by Creation, which was no motion , but a simple and bare emanation : For there is a two-fold mediate action, whereby a cause is sayd to worke , according to which duplicity of action, they have thus distinguished of causes efficient. There is, say the Schoolemen , a double efficient or working cause, one called *Efficiens per transmutationem*, that is, such a cause, whose operation is alway ioyned with some change in the thing working, according as is the resistance, eyther

ther of the body betweene it, and the patient, or of the thing whereon hee worketh, which doth more or lesse withstand his impression. The other is, *Efficiens per emanationem*, as when without any repugnancy of any patient or labour of the agent, the effect or worke doth voluntarily and freely arise from the action of the working cause: as the shadow from the body: such is God, whose unresistable power by his bare word of command, even of nothing made this admirable worke of the world, as the shadow and obicure representation of his wisdom and omnipotency: not changed in his nature, there beeing nothing by *Reaction* to imprint any thing in the impassionable *Godhead*. And this is the full and sufficient answer to the second argument. Thirdly, they reason thus: There is an eternall mover, therefore there hath been an eternall motion and a thing moved, inasmuch as these relatives cannot be but together in nature. For answer whereto we must remember, that there is an absolute, both consideration, and being of God. Absolute I say and out of relation, otherwise Gods being should be onely in relation. It is true indeed, that relatives are alway together

ther in nature beginning to be, and finishing their being, in one and the same moment. For instance, a father is not a father untill he have a sonne, nor is he a father longer than he hath a sonne. And yet for all that those things which are Relatives, may have being, one before another, though not as Relatives, yet as things really subsisting in nature. For example, who can deny that *Adam* was in nature, before eyther conception or birth of his bloudy sonne *Cain*? yet was he not a father untill God had blessed him with that after-cursed off-spring. And who seeth not, that the Carpenter had being in Nature, before he builds the house, although he be no actuall builder till the house be in making? So God that was from everlasting before all times, had his being without motion, though not as a mover, yet as a thing really and perfectly existing; but when in fulnesse of time (according to the free determined purpose of his will) he began the frame of the world, then also began he to be a Relative, a builder in respect of this goodly house and palace, the world; a *Father*, that is, the Beginning of being unto the Childe of the Creation, the image of his *greatnesse*; and indeed, in these and such kind of controver-

sies, we must warily use these termes of relation, especially in regard of the Creatures, lest wee binde God onely unto a relative being, and so make his existence dependent on the Creatures.

Theyr fourth argument is in substance this: If God so long before had being without being a Creator, there was doubtlesse some defect in the foregoing time, the supply whereof in the moment of creation moved him to make the world rather at that time than any other. For there is no new action but presupposeth some new incitement, which moved the Agent to undertake the worke, more then before; but there could be nothing at this time more than before, that could move God the principall and perfectest workeman, to take in hand this businesse and worke rather now, than before; for then how could he be the primary and principall cause? But this in short may be the answer; Indeed there was all this time an impediment, forasmuch as God would not actually create, untill the time foreappointed in his secret purpose was accomplished. Nay, but say the adversaries, God untill this time was indifferent to create, or not to create, therefore there was in
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the instant of the Creation some thing that restrained this his indifferency. But we may answer, That there was no such indifferency, (as they talke of,) God having from all eternity, purposely determined at this time to begin the worke of the Creation. So that unto the fore-mentioned demand of the Atheist, why God deferred the creating of the world untill this inoment of time, we may answer, that of the choise of this time, rather then any other, for this his worke, there can no other reason be given, but his most free-will, that in his decree of Creatiō restrained, and bound it selfe to this time, rather than unto any other. Now if they shall reply, that we are not to imagine Gods will unreasonable, and therefore no doubt there was some reason that moved him to this limitation of his will: we may answer, That we doe not deny but God had some reason (though not without himselfe) of this his prorogation. Nay we may without offence, goe so farre, as to give some reason of this dilation, in generall; That God would not from everlasting create the world, to shew the independency of his existence in regard of the Creatures: as also, to give vs understand, that not for any hope of benefit, which should

proceed to him from the Creatures, he undertooke this worke: but rather (as it is the property of goodnesse to communicate it selfe) out of the overflowing fountaine of his indefectiue *Goodnesse*, to derive some commodity unto vs his Creatures: for hee that could so long be without vs, might without any inconveniency unto himselfe, for ever have continued in that state of *Lonelinessse*. So that, of the deferring of the Creation, in generall, there may be a reason giuen; but why hee began at this time rather than at any other, either before or after, there is no other reason, but his owne free-will, knowne unto us, but here ariseth a doubt, whether God could have begun sooner, or put off longer this worke of Creation. The answer is, that he could by his potentiall and absolute power; he could not by his actual and conditionall. For Gods power hath a two-fold consideration, the one absolute, without regard of any his decrees whatsoever, whereby he is able to doe all, even those things, that he will not; the other conditionall, ioyned with the consideration and respect of his will, whereby he is able to doe all things which hee will, and onely those things which he will, God therefore respected.

cted without his decree, was able, sooner or later to create the world; but if we consider him together with his purpose, hee could not cyther have prevented, or deferred this his intended worke of the Creation: Nor do we heerby robbe God of his freedome, or binde him to any part of the contradiction, but if he be bound, sure hee hath bound himselfe, having this Law onely prescribed him, that he deny not himselfe, that is indeed to take away his Godhead. But if God would not from everlasting make the world, how is he not changed in his will? The answer is, that God would from everlasting make the world, but he would not make the world from everlasting; that is in playner termes: God had from everlasting a will and purpose to create the world, but it never was his will, that the world should have a coeternall being with himselfe; so that Gods will is still the same altogether unaltered. But they farther urge this argument, demanding how God by an everlasting and old action of his will, could in time create the world anew, remaining himselfe unchangeable. To which wee may answer, that a continued action of his will, how ancient soever, executing onely that which he before

intended, may well stand without admissi-
on of alteration; as for example, if the pur-
pose of my will to day, be to journey toward
London the next weeke, which also accor-
ding unto purpose I performe; will any man
say my will is changed? In like sort, *God*
from everlasting decreeing to create the
world at such a time, if at the time purposed
this his decree be put in execution, is not
thereby changed. Nay rather he is thereby
to be thought more unchangeable, for as
much as he performeth that which before
he did determine. Why but, say they, *God*
is not freed from alteration, because that
of a *New-Creator*, hee was made a *Creator*.
The answer is, That *God* was not heereby
changed, albeit there was indeed some
change (though improperly so called) when
as the world proceeded frō not being unto
being: for the succession of a being, after a
not being, importeth some alteratiō, though
not in the author of the new being, but ra-
ther in the thing that received that being;
we shall make it plaine by this supposition.
Let us imagine a vault or other close place,
so fenced from the Sunne beames, that no
light, not the least glimmering can pierce it,
which afterward by digging or some such
means,

meanes, may have passage made thorough it, for the Sunnes access; would we say that the Sunne were by this meanes altered, because it inlightneth a place which before was full of darknesse? Even so, and much more so, God the fountaine of Light, (whose Spirit moving upon the Waters, whereas before there was darknesse upon the face of the deepe, enlightned that darknesse, distinguishing, those things which before were confusedly mixed, or rather bringing them from nothing, to this their perfection) is not at all altered, but still remaineth the same, ever unchangeable. And indeed, if every new worke of God should make him changeable, how should he not be often changed, creating daily the soules of new living men? For to say they haue being before their ioyning unto the body, is plainly hereticall, and Origen was in that behalfe accused of a very grosse error. Nor is it likely, nor yet indeed possible, they should come by *translation* or propagation from our Parents. For our Soules being as the Angels are *Spiritual* substances, are as farre from that ability of procreation, as the Angels are, those supernaturall celestiall Creatures: and there is the like reason for both. The Angels by

reason of their Spirituality, are voyd and uncapable of procreation, mens Soules also being no lesse Spirituall than the Angels, are also unfit for procreation: Therefore one Soule begets not another, much lesse comes it of a corporall seed, it selfe being Spirituall. It remaines therefore that they are then anew created by God, and so coupled unto theyr bodyes. Neyther is God for this cause changed, seeing, as is aforesayd, he doth now onely put in execution, that which before he had in intention; and therefore (to conclude this whole argument, with that saying of *Hugo de Sancto Victore*) *Gods Will was Eternall, and the Worke of his Will was temporary; for alwayes even from Eternity, he had a will to create the world; yet never was he purposed to make the world from Everlasting, but his purpose and will was to make that in time which he purposed before time to make in time. Therefore by his ever being goodnesse he for ever purposed: by his Eternall Wisedome hee alway disposed that, which by his everlasting power he once composed.* Fiftly, they reason from the Eternity of time, in this sort. Time is Eternall, therefore there is also an Eternall motion; for time is the measure of mooving. Now the antecedent is thus proved: That which hath

hath beene alway, and shall be for ever, is Eternall ; but such is the condition of time : for you can designe us no moment or instant before which, Time was not, and after which, Time shall not remaine. For, as *Aristotle* sayth, every *now*, or instant of time is the end of time past, and beginning of time to come : as in a right Line, every middle point is the end of the fore-part of the Line, and the begining of the part following. To which we may answer by rejecting this theyr description of time, for (as *Scaliger* hath well observed) motion is rather the measure of time ; and thence it is (as I take it) that *Plato* called the Sunne and Starres times Instruments, and as it were the *Jacobs staffe* of time ; because by theyr motion and circinvolution we measure the indurance of the world. And therefore also (as I conceive it) the Poets called *Saturne*, that is Time, Heavens Sonne, because that from their circular moving, came the distinction of Dayes, and Moneths, and Yeeres. And to say the truth, there is a more generall, and true definition of times then this of *Aristotle*, and it is this : *The past, present and future indurance of things* : Which also the authors of this discription distinguish into

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it kinds. There is (say they) a time perpetuall, or eternall, Gods owne peculiar attribute, who alone indureth from Generation to generation; and there is an indurance or Time momentary, incident unto the Creatures. In this sense therefore it is no absurdity to say, there was a time when *Aristotles* time was not: for hee maketh time of the same age with the heavens motion, so that, untill the Heavens began to bee mooved, *Aristotles* time was not: yet was there time before the Heavens Creation, that is a long space of indurance, in which God alone had being. But because time is indeed proper unto the Creatures, being as (other bodily and spirituall Creatures) in Scripture sayd to be made by God, let us follow *Aristotle* in his owne Definition, and to his obiection out of his *Schoole-interpreters* we may fetch this answer; That euery *Nunc*, and instant of time is not both beginning of time to come and end of time past: for there is a threefold instant or *Nunc*. The first is *instans*, or *Nunc initiatiuum*, an instant onely of beginning. The second they tearme, *Nunc continuatiuum*, a continuing instant, and that is both beginning in respect of time following, and end in regard of time past. There is a third instant

instant or moment, and that they call *Nunc
finiens*, or *terminatum*, and that is such an
instant, as only is an end of time foregoing :
They may all bee thus illustrated, as in a
straight line, the first pricke or point is only
the beginning of the line, the last point onely
the end of the same, the rest in the middle
are both, the end of that part of the Line
which was before drawn, and the beginning
of the hinder part. So in time, we may point
out an *instant* that is onely *beginning*, another
that is onely an *end*, a third that is both a *be-
ginning* and *end*. *Aristotle* his authority there-
fore can truly be understood onely of the
continuing and coupling instant. But against
this distinguishing answer, *Aristotle* hath this
exception : If there be any such *instant*, as is
only a *beginning* in respect of time following,
and no end of that time which went before,
then before this instant there was no time.
What then ? Therefore there was an *Ante*
without time, which is absurd. For *Ante* and
Post, *before* and *after*, are differences of time :
As for example : When we say *Philip* lived
before *Alexander*, this word *Before*, signifies
a difference in time, betwixt *Philip* and
Alexander his sonnes being. But who seeth
not more subtilty than soundnesse in this re-
ply

ply of *Aristotle*; for we will in like sort thus reason against him. In his *Physicks* he hath this *Psotion*, *Extra cælum nullus est locus*: Beyond Heaven there is no place; therefore, there is some *extra*, in which is no place. For *extra* and *intra*, *Without* and *Within*, are differences of place; as for example: when we say he is without doores, our meaning is, that he is in some place without the house. Now if we should thus reason against *Aristotle*: There is out of heaven a roome or place to be in; for *extra* without, is a difference of place, things being said to be without onely in regard of place. But *Aristotle* sayth *extra cælum*, therefore there is without the inward hollow compasse of heaven an externall out-roome: would he not straight (and that justly) reprove our Sophistry? For *Aristotle* his meaning in that place is, that all things whatsoever are containd within the inside of the body of *Heaven*: and it is as if hee had sayd, there is no place, but within the inside of the over cast circle of *heaven*. In like sort, when we say that before this first moment of the heavens motion, there was no time; our meaning is, that all reall time had beginning with the heavens moving. *Reall time*, I say; for there is *time* only imaginary, improperly

improperly called *time*, as being rather a part of Eternity, and of that indurance and long continuance, which wee conceive to have beene in God before the Creation of the world. And thus shall wee reade the words, *Before*, and *After*, used among the ancient Writers both Christian and Prophane: for so did *Ovid* use it in the beginning of his *Metamorphosis*; *Ante mare & terras, & quod tegit omnia cælum*: Before that heaven and earth was made. So in the Scripture: *Before the foundations of the World were layd, thou art God from everlasting, world without end*. Where it signifies no true and really subsisting time, for this time began only with the motions of the heavens, as *Aristotle* himselfe witnesseth. In brieft therefore, to shut up this Argument and this whole controversie; The first instant and moment of time reall (before mentioned) was both a *beginning* and *end*; a *beginning* of *time reall*, and an *end* of *time imaginary*: nor is it any absurdity to say, that *time imaginary* was before *true and really subsisting time*.

And thus have we with all possible speed runne over the reasons which bee usually brought to prove the worlds being from everlasting; let us now with like or lesse
brevity

brevity passe over those reasons which serve to improve this errour: and they are onely two, which we will but propound, avoiding over-tedious long discourse; and so goe on to the other part of the question. First then, from our owne experience we reason thus: It is a truth confirmed by the tryall of all times, that the quantities of mens bodyes have a perceivable impayring, as also the length and continuance of their lives: so that, if in that infinit space of foregoing time men had had being (as without question, the world was never voyde of men, the principall and most noble member thereof) through continuall and incessant decay, theyr bodyes had beene brought to as little a quantity as they are capable of, if not cleane consumed: but we see their quantity is not yet come unto the lowest; therefore had they not being from everlasting. Secondly and more specially, had this world beene from everlasting, infinite also had beene the propagation of man; and so we would bring into the world an actuall infinitenesse, as absurd in Nature as Paralogismes bee in Logicke: for in this infinite space and generation there had beene an infinite number of mens Soules, which beeing
by

by Nature incapable of Mortality, we can not say, that as one was created another was destroyed, and so should there be an *infiniteness* in regard of number, actually subsisting in Nature. And thus hoping that small power will serve to confound an adversary already overcome, wee passe to the other part of the Question, purposing as much brevity as its difficulty and obscurity will beare.

The Question is touching the worlds immortality, whether, as it had a beginning of being, so it shall also have an end. *Aristotle* when he first heard of their opinion, who appointed an end unto the world, scoffingly burst out into these words: *I was once afraid that my house eyther by force of tempest, or by injury of time, or lastly by some defect in the workman-ship, should haue suddenly over-whelmed me, but now I have great cause to feare my owne and my houses ruine, because of those that in words goe about to pull downe the World.* But for the playner and more speedy proceeding in the controversie, let us in one word set downe the true meaning of the question. There is a two-fold end, the one of *corruption*; the other of *annihilation*: the end of *corruption*, I call that whereby a thing is changed

changed from *being* to a not *being*, not simply as if it ceased altogether to be in nature, but because it looseth that being which before it had ; as for example, when wood by force of fire is turned into ashes, we may not untruely say , there is a corruption of the wood, forasmuch as it ceaseth to be wood, & is become ashes ; yet can we not say here is any annihilation, for we see there is a substance remaining, but the matter which before was under the forme of wood, hath now put on the forme of ashes, & so of wood corrupted, are ashes generated, according to that worne Axiome of *Aristotle*, *That the corruption of one thing, is the generation of another*. The end of annihilation is, when a thing so looseth its present being, that no part thereof, neyther matter nor yet forme abideth any longer in Nature ; but as it first was made of nothing, so is it againe turned into nothing. The question then (as I take it) must be thus understood, that the world shall have an end, though not of annihilation, yet of corruption ; that is in other terms, though it shall not utterly be abolished and turned unto nothing, (for the matter thereof shall still remaine) yet shall it be changed into another estate and condition. The first
part

part of the assertion is proved by the authority of the learned. For *Plato* witnesseth in his *Timæus*; so sayth *Boetius* and *Methodius*, and *Damasceus* in his second Booke viz. of *Orthodoxal faith*: testified also by the wise *Salomon*, *Eccles. 3. I have learned* (saith the Preacher) *that all the Works of the Lord endure for ever.* That is, as I interpret it, though not without corruption, yet without annihilation. Now whether they have this state of corruption by Nature or no, there is a great question: but we may probably answer, that of themselves and their naturall disposition infused by God. they haue no naturall inclination, or desire of corruption, much lesse of annihilation, forasmuch as euery thing hath a Naturall Love of its being, and an innated hatred of all things that be enemies unto the same, testified by that naturall Sympathie and Antipathy which may be observed in things destitute of reason: for so we see in experience the *Lambe* which never had experience of the *Woolves* cruelty, even at the first sight doth tremble and flye for feare: Nay, in Creatures of a lower degree than these, termed by *Aristotle*, *Plant-animals*, we may observe, the like antipathy. *Scaliger*
E reporteth

reporteth of a Tree, growing in the Province which hee calles *Pudofaramea*, that at a mans neere approaching, for modesty, draweth in his farre-spreading boughes, at his departure spreads it selfe againe, for that cause tearmed by the Inhabitants, the *Shame-fast-tree*. But wee may more probably attribute this its contraction, to a naturall divining (as it were) and fore-fee-ling that it hath of some harme, whereof it is in danger, as may be proportionably gathered by the like behaviour in other things of the same kind. For so *Aristotle* writeth of the *Spongies* that (when a man puts forth his hand to displace them, as also before a tempest) shrinke up together on a heape, as if they meant to shift for themselves, either by flight, or else by uniting theyr dispersed forces, for the stronger resistance; which are evident proofes of that naturall ingrafted desire in all things to preserve there being. For whereas the first matter is sayd to desire corruption, for that as not contented with the forme it presently enioyeth, it desire another, whercupon followes the expulsion of the former before inherent: the answer is, that in his labouring to procure another forme, then that it had: it intends not corruption,

ruption, but rather perfection, not disliking the form incumbent, seeing it desireth both; but as *Esops dogge*, snatching greedily at the shadow which he thought had beene a substance, meant not to lose that which he had fast hold of in his teeth. So the first matter greedily carried to the desire of many formes wherein indeed consisteth its perfection, looseth that which before it had: forasmuch as by a Law of Nature, *Two formes of diuers, not subordinate, kinds, are at the same time unsufferable together.* So then it desires perfection, but instead thereof accidentally gaineth corruption & expulsion of the preexistent forme. Nothing therefore simply desires it owne corruption, but so as it may tend to it further perfection, & consummation, much lesse its utter abolition. For as much as it is farre better to be in the vilest and most base degree of being, then not to be at all. Therefore the annihilation of the world shal not be of it selfe, nor yet by any meanes internall. Nor can it proceed from any externall naturall agent, no not that universall fore-mentioned nature is able to bring it unto nothing: For as Nature cannot make something of nothing, so neither is she of power sufficient to bring a thing from being, to an utter not

being at all, having a limited and finit power. To which purpose a learned Fryer said excellently well. That, *the first maker of all things in respect of its being and not being, is subject only unto Gods Will, permitted to the rule of Naturall agents only in regard of transmutation.* For a Naturall agent may induce or expell a forme either substantial or accidentall. But how farre soever mans power or Nature is caried in fury, labouring by might and maine towards an utter ruinating, and destruction of things, yet shall it never attaine unto *Annihilation*. They may indeed by tyrannous inflicting of death, make that which is neere the matter of a man, the matter of a carcase, they may also with fire, burne the dead corps, but though a thousand thousand woods should bee spent in burning of one poore carcase, yet were they never able utterly to annihilate and bring it unto nothing. So that Nature is too weake to cause *Annihilation*. But yet say the scrupulous adversaries, God who by his infinite and supernaturall power was able of nothing to make the world, is by the same his boundles power able at his pleasure to returne it to nothing. It is true indeed & out of question, that God by his absolute undecayed power,

er, is sufficient as well to destroy the world as he was at the beginning, to make it: by his absolute power (I say) considered without regard of his will, but if we respect his power, restrained by his will: that is regard what he will and hath decreed to do, if by his word we may learne his will, we may truly answer, that God himselfe cannot annihilate the word, because he can do nothing that implyeth contradiction, or that any way importeth mutability, whereby of God he should bee made no God. Nor do we hereby take away his omnipotency, nay rather we establish his power, it being a chiefe poynt of infirmity and weaknesse, to bee capable of change, and able to deny it selfe: but God hath decreed not to annihilate the world, therefore he cannot now turne it unto nothing, how then (may some man say) shall it have an end, for if neyther of it selfe it incline, nor can be by any meanes naturall inforced to Annihilation, no nor God himselfe can turne it into nothing, what end shall it have? The answer is, that as man hath his end by death, whereas, notwithstanding his soule is immortal, his body is onely changed into its first matter, not turned into nothing: so the world though incapable of annihilation, as

hath beene proved, yet hath in it an end unevitable, when it shall be changed from the present corrupt estate into a far more excellent and heavenly condition of indurance and immortality. But here ariseth a doubt, moved by those scoffers that *Peter* prophesied should come in the last dayes, which demand, *Where is the promise of his coming: For since the father fell or sleepe, all things have continued alike from the beginning of the Creation.* Where by the way, let us observe that they make the time of *Christs* coming, and the end of the world, things of one and the same signification, so that as many testimonies of Scripture, as warrant the certainty of *Christs* coming, serve also to prove the worlds end and dissolution. To their reason we may answer with *Peter*, that the worlds long and hitherto unchanged continuance, is no sure prooffe of impossibility to bee destroyed. For God that by his bare word could of nothing make the world, can now also with as great facility alter the state of it same. But their supposition is most untrue, for the world hath not from the beginning continued in the same state unaltred, the whole earth being in *Noahs* flood overwhelmed with waters, - But to this they may answer,

swer, that it was no generall or universall destruction, being extended onely to the living creatures, & they also in part preserved in *Noahs* Ark. It is true indeed, that this was onely a particular or partiall destruction, the Heavens remayning altogether untouched, the other Elements also incorrupted. But yet this sheweth a chāge in the worlds estate which they seemed to deny. Touching the generall distinction of all things, *Peter* after answereth; to which place we will refer the: But that wherein the difficulty of the whole controversie consisteth, is the immutable estate of the heavenly bodyes, wherein hath beene observed by experience of all Ages, a constancy almost admirable: when in this sublunary region of elementish bodies, there hath beene as great variety, and almost a circular alteration. And indeed, were the heavens capable of corruption, how could the Spheare of the Moone, scituated so neere the fire have continued so long unconsumed. Let us therefore a litle examine how the cause stands: with the Heavens in the matter of corruption.

There are two different opinions of them
that make the heavens incorruptible, some
o deliver them from corruption, have made

them voyd of all matter, others allot them a matter, but in a distinct kinde from that of the sublunary bodies, all agreeing, that they be incorruptible. The chiefe of the first Sect, is *Averroes*, a learned Turke, who expostulating the matter with us, demands by what meanes we came to know the matter of the Heavens? For the onely meanes to proove the existence of matter in any thing, is, as he calleth it, *Substantiall transmutation*; or more plainly, the *succession of formes*. But in Heaven there hath beene no such succession, no nor any alteration of qualitiēs, therefore the Heavens are *immateriall*; But wee may answer, first that the being of matter in any thing is known as well by accidentary, or locall, as by *substantiall transmutation*. But the heavens have a locall Motion, or Mutation, at least in their parts, therfore they consist of matter. Secondly, we answer thus, that although the heavens haue all this while lasted without change in their substance, yet seeing they are capable of future transmutation, we may thence conclude the presence of matter in them. For who would say, that there is in a sucking child no reasonable soule because he seeth in him no actuall use of reason, or present conceit of Learning, we know that

that his potentiall disposition and fitnesse to conceive, is testimony sufficient of that soule which is in him. Their second argument is this, all things consisting of a corporall matter, are withall corruptible for the ability of receiving the yet absent formes being a property inseparable from the matter, which also is accompanied with a longing desire to supply its defects, there must needs be granted an expulsion of the incumbent forme for induction of a new successor, wherein is corruption; or els this, The matters inclination and ingrafted desire, as it were, must be alway frustrate, which folly, the most wise God of Nature detesteth; therefore there is in the heavens no such matter as we talke of. To which Argument, they that make the matter of the celestiall bodies different from that of the Sublunary Creatures, frame this answer: Indeed (say they) whatsoever is compounded of such a matter as this is, of the Sublunary creatures, is subject unto corruption; but the heavens haue a matter of a different and farre more excellent state than these under Elements, and that is the summe and foundation of *Aristotle* his opinion and reason touching the Heavens incorruptible condition. But we that make one matter of
both,

both, may thus somewhat probably answer: That though such a matter is alway accompanied with a capablenesse of corruption, yet may it by some superior overruling power, be preserved from all actual corruption. And so standeth the case with the heavens, which never had beene able of themselves so long to have continued without alteration, but by the helpe of some higher power, ~~not as~~ the Peripateticks and Platonicks ~~loosely~~ imagine the Angels or Intelligences (which *Alecinous* calleth lesser Gods) but by the soveraigne appoyntment of God, who to moderate and stay the too frequent and overhasty alteration of the under bodyes, hath allotted the heavens this regularity and uniformity of motion. But here they will demand a reason, what hath so fulfilled the matters desire of interchangeable succession of formes, that it remaineth contented with that forme which it presently inioyeth. The answer is: That eyther the excellencie of the forme present causeth this contentment, or else Gods appoyntment overswayeth its desire. How then? Are we Patrons or rather Authors of violence in those excellent agreeing bodyes? Nay rather, by the limitation of the matters unstayed indifference,

reencie, we doe more establissh that their excellent harmonie. For as in a City scituate on the confines of two disagreeing kingdomes, of it selfe inclining to neyther side, but indifferent for entertainment of eyther conquering Adversary, if after valorous conquest performed by one party, it yeeldeth it selfe to the vanquishers Dominion, and by the provident industrious care of the new supervisor, be fortified against the violent irruption of the forevanquished adversaries; by this new restraint of its old indifferency suffereth no violence, but rather is confirmed in a quiet and peaceable condition within it selfe: so the matter of the celestiall bodyes, howsoever naturally indifferent to entertaine any forme, if by the conquering action of some prevailing Agent it bee possessed of so excellent and powerfull a forme, as admits of no outward new impression in this limitation of its equall instable disposition, is not any way violenced, but rather fitter for the intended harmony of the celestiall bodyes. And that may serve for a sufficient reason of the hitherto incorrupted condition of the celestiall bodyes. Now touching their future estate, we shall after dispute, if first we have their fourth argument

ment for disproofe of the matter, as also the substance of their opinion. *Averroes* therefore sayth, that Heaven is a forme of a selfe-subsistence; immateriall, dimensionall, locally mooveable, participating light and other accidents; wherein (me thinketh) is a plaine contradiction: for to omit the disquisition, whether any forme can consist without matter, what is more absurd then to imagine quantity really separate from the matter, quantity hauing its basis and foundation in the matter, and onely limitation from the forme? farther, whatsoever is capable of reall diuision, hath this capability (that I may so terme it) from the matter: *Reall diuision*, I say, for the *Mathematicians* proportionably to their mentall abstraction or separation of quantity, have also a mentall diuision, but whatsoever hath quantity, is capable of such a diuision, therefore also it hath a matter. Over and beside all this, whatsoever is perceivable by sense, hath a matter; for the forme of nothing can be perceived by sense but is understood and conceived by its operation in the matter: but the heaven is sensible, therefore also materiall. To this adde *Averroes* his owne testimony, set downe in his Comment upon *Aristotle* his seuenth booke

booke of Metaphysicks, wherein himselfe confesseth, that accidents are inseparable companions of the first Matter; but the heauen (by his owne authority in the first alleaged place) hath in it light and other accidents inherent, how then is it altogether voyd of matter? Other Arguments taken from the inherency of qualities peculiarly incident unto things materiall, for brevitie sake, I omit, hastning to the second Patrons of the Heavens immortality, that doe acknowledge a composition of a matter and a forme in the celestiaall bodyes, but will have it a different and a distinct kinde from the elementish matter of the under bodies.

Touching the sence of the question, *Plato* and some of his followers in this error, interpret it, as if when we say, the heavens consist of elementary matter, wee meant that they are so compounded of the Elements, as are mixt bodyes here below: whereupon some of the more ancient Sectaries in this kind, as *Heracitus* and *Pythagoras*, thought that it was made of fire: *Thales* and *Anaximenes*, of Earth; *Empedocles*, of a medley of ayre and fire; *Plato* himselfe, of the foure Elements, or (as *Proclus* recordeth his opinion) of the quintessence of them: whose refutation

tation we omit, as impertinent unto our purpose: for our meaning is not that the Elements are the matter whereof the heavens be made, but thus we understand it, that the matter of the Ethereall and Elementish Bodies is of the same kind; the whole first matter being divided into these principall parts, as into halfe, the one halfe united unto the formes celestiall, the other halfe coupled unto the formes of the Elements: and so (as I conceiue) is that place in the beginning of *Genesis* to be understood, where it is sayd, that *In the beginning God created the Heaven and the Earth*, that is; the matter whereof *heaven* and the *elements* were afterwards made, signified unto us by the name of those *waters* whereupon the spirit of God was *mooued*: and me thinketh the argument is very sound, which is commonly alledged by our partakers: for as in other kindes of causes, there is one, first & principall whereunto all the rest are reduced, so also in this kinde of the Matter, there being the like reason of all. But if we distinguish the Matter of the heavens from that of the elements, we cannot come to one first Matter of all things; therefore there is the same Matter both of the celestial & inferior bodies, to which we may
 adde

adde that thredbare argument of the Philosophers, *Without necessity we must not imagine a plurality in Nature*, forasmuch as Nature abhorreth Vanity; but there is no necessity of the matters plurality; for the maine ground of this distinction (for ought that I can see) is, lest they should bee forced to grant a power in the heavens tending to corruption, which (as is before said) hath no necessary illation, forasmuch as the excellency of the forme present, restraineth the wandering indifferent desire of the matter, resisting the violent impression of forrain qualities that should breed Rebellion of the subiect creatures, against their commander the heavens. But touching their reasons (in my poore opinion) they are very insufficient: for first thus they dispute: The formes of the sublunary bodies may be separated from their matter, but the heavens forme is unseparable; when in my iudgment they prove rather a distinction of formes, than any diversity of the matter. Or if they thence proove a diversity of matter, because the formes incident, are of greater and lesse excellency, one in respect of another, we may as well say, that the body of a man is of distinct matter from that of the other more

base

base creatures, because his forme is so passing excellent. Or if they reſtraine their comparison onely to the power of ſeparation, that because the matter of the heavens is joyned inſeparably to the forme, when contrariwiſe the elementish matter hath often ſeparation, therefore there is not the ſame matter of both: wee answer, that the ſame matter in *kind*, may ſo inſeparably bee united to its forme, as that it can never be ſejoyned; not that we deny a power of future ſeparation of the heavens matter from the preſent forme, but that this may bee a ſufficient reaſon of their hitherto inſeparable union. A ſecond Argument is that of *Aristotle*, ſaith he, whatſoever things participate the ſame matter, are capable of mutable tranſmutation, but the heavens can never bee changed into the inferior bodies; for ſomuch as the Elements are altogether paſſively diſpoſed for receipt of the Heavens action, without any reaction upon the heavens, therefore there is not the ſame matter of both. To which we answer that the propoſition or firſt ſentence muſt be underſtood of a potentiall tranſmutation, and that with this exception; unleſſe the matters imperfectiō be perfected by the formes inherent excellency, or reſiſtance be made

made of some superiour forme, to turne away the violence of the oppugning Agent. We say that the forme now being in the heavens, is of so powerfull and unconquerable a nature, as that no naturall contrary agent is able to compasse any the least new Impression, Thirdly, thus they reason: Were the heavens of the same matter with the bodies of the elements, then in like sort should they (at least by Nature) be corruptible; but the corruption is altogether abhorrent from the heavens nature, To which assumption *Damascen* answers by a flat deniall, for even the heavens in his Philosophy are naturally subject to corruption. To which accordeth that of *Plato* in his *Timæus*, that attributes the heavens incorruptiblenes to a superior more powerfull cause. For so hee brings in the maker of the world speaking unto the celestiall bodies; *By nature you are dissoluble, but through my Will preserved from dissolution. Nor shall the destinies of death prevaile over you, to destroy you, because my Will is a bond of more power to keepe you from corruption, than that wherewith at your first making you were holden together.* And thus have wee hastily runne over the difficult question of the heavens matter. Touching the certainty and meanes

of their dissolution we will briefly speake by and by, after the resolution of the other arguments, for the non-dissolution of the world.

15

Simon Magus, as it is recorded, *lib. 3. Recog. Beati Petri*, (cap. 3. (if the records be true) thus replied upon the learned Apostle for the worlds immortality: If God be infinitely and onely good, and the world also good, how shall God in the end destroy the world? If hee destroy that which is good, how shall himselfe continue good? If hee pull it downe because it is evill, how shall he then be free from evill, that made it evill? To which we answer with *Ste Peter* in the same place: That the world in its first originall state was good, yet so as it was foreordained to dissolution: nor doe wee thereby detract from Gods goodnesse; for the heavens (the most excellent part of the world) being not made for themselves, but for some end after to be revealed; how good soever, yet were to bee dissolved that that for which they were ordayned might appete: which also *Peter* thus familiarly sheweth; Who seeth not how cunningly an Egshell is framed, yet for manifestation of the end of its making, it must be broken of
necessitie

necessity. So must the present estate of the world, of necessity, be destroyed, that the more excellent condition of the Kingdome of Heaven may be made manifest: at which time also this degenerated evill state of corruption shall be done away, that a more glorious estate of incorruption may be restored. So then, that the world shall have an end, I take it, it is manifest; and that, not an end of annihilation, but of corruption: which indeed shall be a way unto its perfection. Now concerning the times and seasons of the worlds dissolution, we will not take upon us curiously to determine, seeing God; the beginning and end of all things, hath left the time unrevealed unto us. Touching the means and manner of the dissolution, the *Stricks* glanced at it a farre off, being of opinion, that the world should by fire be dissolved. For thinking the starres and the skyes fire, to have a wasting action upon the inferiour Elements; theyr nourishing moisture by little and little decaying, when neyther the earth can have refection by the water, nor the aire procreation after its absolute consumption, there shall remaine nothing but fire to consume both the Heavens and the Earth, of which afterward a new world

should be made; whose opinion is very consonant unto that of *Peter*, save onely that they thought this destruction should come of a natural necessity; for *Peter* also taught, it should be by fire, wherewith *God* (withdrawing his hand of preservation) should consume this world, and of the ashes heereof create a new; yet so, as neyther the seate of the blessed soules in heaven, nor the dungeon of the damned in hell should be destroyed; that neyther the joyes of the Saints, nor the torments of the wicked, should be interrupted. As for the firmament and the other inferiour spheres, together with the elements, they shalbe indued with another, & that a far more excellent condition, putting off these accidents and affections of corruption fit for the continuall generation and corruption of the naturall bodyes, and receiving other qualities, agreeable to the incorruptible estate of the world to come; so that they substance shall be all one, howsoever they alter theyr qualities. As in the resurrection mens bodyes shall be of the same substance, but of a different disposition, *For this corruption must put on incorruption, and this mortall must put on immortality.* So that as *Saint Paul* sayd, *our imperfect knowledge which we have*

have in this life, shall in the after-World be abolished, because then we shall have a more full & perfect knowledge of God and his Christ. So may we well say, this world shall be destroyed, because it shall lose this present estate of imperfection and put on a more glorious condition fit for the world to come. And so, I take it, are those places of Scripture to be understood, where mention is made of the worlds perishing, that is, the present estate of this world shall be abolished, and the same substance indued with a more glorious condition. To which accordeth that of David, *Psal. 102. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure, they shall all wax old as doth a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them and they shall be changed:* plainly signifying, that the perishing of the creatures shall be onely an alteration, which God shall bring vpon them.

Now to that fruitlesse question of the heavens motion or rest, we may answer probably, that they shall have an end of moving, for their motion being ordayned onely for ordering things below, especially for continuance of their generation, seeing all propagation of the species in living Creatures, as also mutuall procreation in the elementis

mentish livelelle bodyes being ended, to what purpose should the heavens mooving longer indure? Which may also seemably be answered touching the action and passion of the Elements, as also for the being of things compounded of their mixture, as plants and sensible creatures, being things ordayned onely for mans helpe, and sustenance, who in that blessed state of immortality without the least defect shall need no such supply of his wants; which quiet & restfull estate of these under-bodies, is not, as some have fondly imagined, to be attributed onely unto the quiet rest of the heavens; for when at the prayers of *Joshuah* the Sun stood still, and with it the rest of the celestiallyl bodyes (unless we imagine the whole course of them to have beene perverted) yet ceased not the naturall actions of things below, for even at that time did *Joshua* fight. But the true cause of their rest from motion is, the will of the first cause, without whose adjuvant-follow-working, the secundary causes are quite disabled to performe their functions. From hence therefore, namely from the certainty of the worlds dissolution we thus reason for our maine position. For if the world uncapable of eternity, have a limited

limited time of endurance which it cannot passe, then hath man also his continuance bounded, at least within compasse of the worlds lasting. For location being a thing inseparable from existence, the world, mans habitation, and mansion house being dissolved, man the principall inhabitant, must have a ioynt and fellow dissolution. But for the more through-handling of this undoubted truth, our purpose is more particularly to treat thereof; therefore to leaue this farre fetched, though not impertinent reason, taken from the worlds inevitable destructiō, we will come to a neerer and more proper disquisition, holding our selves within the compasse of mans owne nature.

I haue read of a late living learned Physician, *Paracelsus* by name, who had such confidence in the absolute perfection of his skill, that he doubted not to professe himselfe able by Physicke to preserve a man in so perfect a temperature, that he should neuer dye by sicknesse; but his owne hastie leaving of his life, was confutation sufficient, of his eyther false ostentation, or extreame madnesse. For himselfe eyther not able, which bewrayed his unskillfull impotency, or else unwilling, which shewed his wilfull folly,

folly, ere he came to the prime of his age, before he was thirty yeares old, ended his dayes, learning at length by his owne experience, that Art can never overcome the necessity of Nature; nor mans cunning prevent or pervert the decrees of the destinies. But to the matter in hand, the question is, whether man by nature is subject unto death, the end of Nature? To which we answer, that mans nature hath a double consideration; first in the incorrupt state and purity of Creation; secondly, in the degenerated condition of corruption, which although it were altogether unknowne unto the Gentilish Philosophers, yet is its consideration in part Philosophicall, & therefore not wholly to be omitted. Now in the first consideration of nature, we answer negatively, forasmuch as undefiled nature was incapable of the Soules separation from the body, betweene which there was so absolute and perfect an harmony and consent, that as the under faculties of the Soule, were in subjection to the reasonable and most principall part thereof, without the least jarre and disagreement; so fared it in the body, though compounded of the contrary natures of the foure elements, yet so well tempered

pered by proportion, that there could bee no observance of the least discord. But after that mans pride set abroch by the Divels suggestion, ventred to taste of the forbidden fruit for desire of knowledge; the light of reason being the life of the Soule, overcast by the unavoydable Cloudes of ignorance, there grew a disagreement and quarrell among the subiect inferior parts of the Soule, from whence followed the warre of the Elements in the body, never to bee ended till the field were lost by blood: and therefore excellent was the speech of the Fryer *Ferus*; *The diseases of the body came from sinne the Soules sicknesse, the death of the body from the death of the soule; and who dares say, the dealing is unequall, that hee should incurre the death of the body. Who wilfully rejected the life of the soule? Or who marvelles that the Divell by Gods sufferance tormenteth the body with diseases, that gave the divell a place of dwelling in his soule?* So that the death of the body being the separation of the Soule from the body, was a punishment inflicted for mans wilfull sequestration of himselfe from God; and it is a good collection more then conjecturall, that the body had never beene subiect to the corruption of destruction

tion, had not the Soule beene tainted with the corruption of defiling. Man therefore in his primary state of Creation, was not naturally subiect unto death, but in the defiled condition of corrupted Nature, death is become inevitable; and therefore *Thales Milesius*, one of the seven Wise men, was wont to say, that there was no difference betweene a mans life and his death, being both things agreeable unto Nature; and thence proceeded their resolute contempt of death, because they thought it was inevitable: whereupon the *Epicure* himselfe considering the inevitablenesse of deaths comming, was (as *Maximus* witnesseth) wont to say; *That against other things we must finde some defense and remedie, onely death was unresistable: our body (the undefenced City of our soule) being all unsufficient to withstand the violent assaults of death.* But to leave the infinite testimonies of the learned, grounded upon so long experience, let us deale with reasons more artificiall, let us deale with truth first in particular, that every man hath his endurance dated, which he cannot passe, afterward goe unto the species, to declare it also in the whole kinde.

The principall and maine reason is taken
from

from his composition; for man consisting of a matter and a forme, as doe also the other bodily living Creatures, though the spirituall substance of his Soule be immortall, yet his body being made of the first matter, whose inseparable companion is a desire of change, there must of necessity follow dissolution; for God and nature (according to our presupposition) doing nothing in vaine, this insatiable appetite of receiving new formes, shall not finally remaine wholly frustrate: if therefore we grant an induction of a new forme, we must withall grant an expulsion of that that before was inherent, for as much as two formes of divers kinds are unsufferable together in the same subject, whereupon doth follow the corruption of the whole compound. But if we shall make a more diligent and narrow inquirie into the causes of this dissolution, we may find plenty of reasons ministred to confirme this truth. Now the first cause Naturall of naturall death, is contrariety in the compound; for all corruption presupposing alteration, which is onely betwixt, and by meanes of contrary qualities, contrariety of the inherent qualities, (being the onely cause of alteration) is also cause of the compounds corruption.

corruption, which is farther manifested by experience, for so we see things wherein is least disagreement, to bee of longest continuance, and the immateriall substance of the creatures spirituall, voyd of all contrariety, uncapable also of corruption; so that the inherence of contrariety is one speciall cause of the compounds dissolution. Man therefore, whose body consists of the ever-iarring elements, *Fire, Ayre, Water, Earth*, hath also an unresistable home-bred cause of dissolution. Furthermore, the consent of all Philosophers, and reason it selfe hath set downe this truth as undenyable, that mans life and the chiefe maintenance thereof, consisteth principally, if not wholly, in the due and iust proportionable temperature of the foure first qualities, *Heat, Cold, Drinesse, Moisture*, and till theyr disproportion, there is no danger of death, or any growing sicknesse: whereupon *Averroes* hath this definition of sicknesse; That it is nothing else, but the unnaturall disproportion of those foure qualities, whereby the part whereinto the same is incident, is disabled to performe its naturall functions, whereout ariseth this collectio as necessary, beeing almost all one with those things foresayd, viz. that the disproportion of the
foure

four first qualities, and their swarming from their iust temperature, is cause of their subjects dissolution: but in euery man wee see a declining from his engrafted natural complexion, which also increaseth more and more according as his ages are altered therefore mans dissolution cannot bee auoyded: where (by the way) wee must not let passe the saying of the Philosopher; that *mans life consisteth in heat*, which also is thereby prooved, because in the presence thereof, if it be not excessiue, wee see a kinde of clarity and vigor as it were newly infused, at its departure the wonted or rather farre greater recourse of languor. But we are not so to vnderstand that saying of the Philosopher, as if heat were the sole & onely cause of life; for euen by *Aristotle* his owne witnesse, the temper of the four first qualities, is the truest & most proper continent cause of life: but the meaning is, that our naturall heate is the chiefe instrument of the soule to exercise the vitall functions, as *nutrition*, *augmentation*, and such like, yet so tempered, that it exceed not the proportionable measure of our naturall moisture, the food and nourishment of our heat. And hence is that of *Ficinus*, that *our life, as light, consisteth in heat*,
Whose

*Whose food and maintainance is of an Aery and
fattie moysture, not unlike unto oyle, Whose im-
moderate excessse and impuritie or defect, are all
wasters of our vitall heate; so that there was
as great necessity of moysture as of heat in
the performance of our naturall vitall fun-
ctions, whence came the necessitie of nou-
rishment: for our congregate heate having
a consuming action upon our moysture, the
resistance: thereof being altogether unable
to withstand the heats assaulting action, Na-
ture that like a kinde mother is never wan-
ting to the necessities of her off-spring, hath
bestowed on our soule a faculty, whereby to
restore our decayed moysture, through the
assimilation of the nourishment applyed vn-
to the wasted substance. Now the especiall
meanes of this decay, as is aforesayd, is our
heates assaulting action, whereby the Soule
continually engendreth of our humidity,
new spirits, for maintainance of the vitall &
sensuall actions, which being wasted by their
never-ceasing operation (as nothing is able
long to continue without interchangeable
rest) have of necessity a supply from our
humidity, and our moisture also equally de-
cayed, hath the like supply made by nourish-
ment which wee receive, lest there should
follow*

follow a sudden destruction: hence therefore, that is from the necessity of continuall nourishment, we inferre a decay of naturall moysture, for otherwise wherunto is nutrition directed?

But here remaineth a doubt; for if there be restitution of the lost naturall moysture, made by the receipt of nourishment whence cometh death the end of Nature? For our heat having alway what to feed upon, eyther by Nature or by this outward supply of nourishment, and death never assailing us, but by the banishment and extinguishing of this naturall heate, where is this necessity of ending our life? The answer is, that the impurity of the outward nourishment inwardly applied by degrees tainteth that naturall ingendred humidity, and by its continuall mixture at length wholly corrupteth it. For as in the mingling of water with wine, the greater the infusion of water is, the more is the infeebling and weakning of the Wines force, till at length it bee cleane oppressed and extinguished: so is it in the case of nutrition, wherein though at first our naturall heat and moysture retaine their purity and naturall quality, yet at length by continuall mixture of the alimentary humor, their followeth.

loweth a totall and perfect corruption of their integrity. Now if by the restorative faculty of the Soule there could bee supply made of as pure moysture as that which was lost, the creature might (for any thing in nature) be preserved alive for ever. And therefore *Ficinus* beside the iust proportion of moysture unto the heat, requireth also purity and incorruption in the moisture; for as every moysture is not a preserver of the light of a Lampe, but though oyle maintaines the flame, yet water doth quench it: so is it in the case of our life, which principally consisteth in heat, for the watrish humidity doth cleane extinguish it. And thence it is, that old men when they are neereſt unto their end abound with a watrish humour, yet are they sayd to be cold and dry, as wanting indeed that moysture which is the fittest for their heat to feed upon.

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So that the truth of the position is manifest in the particulars, namely that every man hath an end and tearme of indurance which he cannot passe. Now this end commeth eyther by meanes naturall and growing in him, or by violent and unnaturall meanes. Whereupon they have distinguished death into two kinds, one *Naturall*, the other *Violent*.

lent : Naturall death is where our native moisture is by meanes of our naturall heat (continually working vpon it) consumed & dispatched, whence followeth a lingring, languishing and pining of our naturall heate as wanting what to feed vpon; contrary to the subtil opinion of the fault-finding *Iulius Scaliger*, that thought our naturall heat to be weakned, and in the end cleane consumed onely by want of interchangeable rest, and ceasing from its operation. For as we see fire not wasted by much vse, but lingringly extinguished by decay & want of fit fuel for to feed vpon; so our home-bred naturall heat not tired with ouer-working, but languishing with the decay of fit food, is at length together with our moisture its naturall prouided foode, cleane consumed. To which may be added that saying of *Fernelius* to this purpose, that though *Esculapius* himselfe, the God of *Physicke* had the guiding of the most temperate complexioned man that can be imagined, and that from his birth, to keepe him from all outward annoyances whatsoever, yet hath he in himselfe an home-bred enemy by little and little to spoile him of his life. Vnnaturall and violent death, is when our naturall heat either with

too much cold, or excessive externall heat, or with an immoderate measure of moisture is extinguished. According to which two kinds of death, the learned Schoolemen haue devised a double tearme of our life: There is, say they, *A tearme of Nature*, and there is, *A tearme beside Nature*. *The naturall tearme*, is that utmost time, that a man by his complexion can reach unto, which is farther off or neerer according to the differences of mens temperatures. *The terme or limit beside nature*, is when mans life either cometh short of that length which by his complexion hee may attaine unto, or is protracted and prolonged beyond the course of nature, & that they call the end or terme of *Gods prescience*, & fore-appointment in his unrevealed will, which a man can neyther prevent, nor yet prolong: and this hath for the most part place in violent death; and was therefore also propounded by those devout Schoolemen, lest men should not thinke they depended only upon chance, or fell out without Gods especiall counsell and disposing. For so we see in daily experience, many men in the prime of their yeares, and strength of their age, eyther by ryot, or famine, pestilence or sword, suddenly cut off, and we are many times

times mooved with pity in that behalfe, be-
wayling their estate that in our judgements
might have lived a great deale longer: as
indeed they might, if we respect what they
were capable of by their complexion; but in
regard of Gods decree and purpose it was
impossible for them to passe that moment
and poynt of time: for Gods prescience can
never be deceived. And this, to auoyd tedi-
ousnesse, may briefly serue for the certainty
of the end of particular men.

Now for the indurance of man in *specie* (in
which regard onely he is said to be a part of
the world) we may passe over unto it by way
of *Prolepsis*, or preoccupation. For it may
be objected, that though there is a limited
endurance of particular and single men, yet
there may be a perpetual preservation of the
species, or kinde: and therefore God hath
bestowed on man a faculty of procreation to
propagate his kinde; that though every
man must (of a naturall necessity) dye, yet
might he leaue another of his owne kinde
behinde him, that so there might be a conti-
nuall and everlasting succession. To which
we answer, that if they grant a corruption in
the particular, they must withall grant it in
the *species*. For the *species* being a thing ex-

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istent onely in imagination, not having any
reall being, but as wee conceiue of it in the
particulars, it is a necessary illation, that from
the corruption of all the particulars, we may
conclude the like of the generall. But to
shew it more plainely, by a demonstratiue
proceeding, we may obserue the like course
of decay in the *species* as there is in the *indi-
uiduum*. For as nutrition is to the particular,
so is generation to the *species*, in the case of
their continuance and preservation: where-
fore as by the nourishment we take for resti-
tution of our naturall moisture, there being
supplied not so pure humidity as was lost, the
particulars decaying by little and little, are
at last cleane consumed: so by procreation,
the maintenance of our *species*, the purity of
our complexion being by degrees and by
time diminished, at length there followes,
euen of necessity, an absolute corruption.
Now (as I conceiue of it) the decay commeth
thus, for the particulars, whose function this
generation is, being by continuall mixture
of outward nourishment corrupted, the seed,
the matter and meanes of propagation cannot
but be tainted with like corruption. And
that is the chiefe reason amongst other lesse
principall, that men in this age of the world
are

are of lesse continuance than they were in former time. From all which we thus conclude; if the naturall vigour of the *species* be by little and little continually weakened, there must of necessity, in the end follow a full and perfect corruption. For (as *Aristotle* said of the division of any thing finite, that by oftendetractiō, though but of a little quantity, the whole becommeth at length uncapable of division) so by contrinual wasting of the vertue of the kinde, there followeth at length even of necessity, a totall and inevitable extinguishing.

Now to that frivolous fruitlesse question, whether this end and destruction bee of nature, or proceedeth from any effectuall operation of God; wee may thus answer: that we dispute not what shall be in this case, but what may bee: and according to that sense wee say, that even of a naturall necessitie (though God should not untimely cut off the thred of our life) yet even of its owne accord, should whole mankind have an end; which is manifest by that forenamed continually curtalling of our life, observed by experience, and noted out of the legends of antiquities: for before that universall deluge in *Noahs* time, we reade of some that

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lived, six, seven, eight, nine hundred yeares; as *Adam*, *Noah*, *Methusalem*, and others. After the flood, he that lived longest, recorded in holy History, exceeded not the age of a hundred and twenty yeares; some few yeeres after, in *Dauids* time, it fell to seventy yeares, or if there were any over-plus, it was mingled with labour and sorrow, more worthy the name of death than life. So that we may hence conclude, that it is impossible for mankinde to last for ever, having inwardly in his nature sufficient and unpreventable causes of dissolution.

Having thus evidenced the truth of our two positions, that there is a set time of indurance unto every man and unto all mankind, and learning by experience, the naturall and true mother of knowledge, that among the particulars some have a longer, some a shorter time of continuance, and that even by nature; it remaineth that with all possible brevity and perspicuity, wee set downe the causes naturall of this naturall difference, which we can no otherwise do, than by propounding the received causes of the length and shortnesse of mans life, and according as they are more or lesse in any man, so judge of their effects, *Aristotle* (in his preface to
this

this treatise) premitteth a word or two touching the divers consideration of this difference according to the diversity of that subject unto which they are incident. For in these tearmes, of *length*, and *shortnesse* of life, we may compare eyther things of the same kinde, as man with man, or things of divers kinds, as reasonable Creatures with livelesse and sensible things, for there are some unreasonable Creatures longer lived then man, for so *Hesiodus* reporteth of the Crow, that he liveth out nine mens lives (measuring every age to be 100. yeares) the Hart, by the same authors witnesse, thrice as many: the Raven trebleth the Harts endurance: and thence was that plaint of dying *Theophrastus*, and complaint of natures inequality & as it were blindfolded disposition of her benefits, especially in this kind, that to *Harts* and *Crowes* so thanklesly had given so long time of continuance, which was denyed unto man, that could and would have better employed that benefit. Which complaint was personally renewed and aggravated by *Berwaldus*, an old *Grammarians*, for he sticks not in the person of some captious Atheist to expostulate the matter with God, why our life (in these times) is so curtalled, that for the many hun-

dreds of yeares which in the first age of the world men lived, wee have our stint and limits within the compasse of little more than halfe an hundred? But *Iosephus* in his first booke of *Antiquities*, giveth these reasons, and first of all the wholesome goodnesse of their nourishment, and the outward compassing elements which they inhabited. For their corrupted Nature was not greedily carried with desire of their corruptions increase as headlongly & on the sudden to engulfe it selfe into all extremity, but by degrees and lingringly, as upon constraint by little and little descendeth from that top and perfection of corruption. And as every thing was neereft unto that beginning, so was it cleereft and lesse tainted with corruption. We therefore in the last age and extremity of the world, are in a more extreame degree of corruption, by reason of that frequent alteration in the Elements, when every mutation addeth somewhat to the begun impurity. A second reason was Gods wil & bountifulnes, the benefit whereof was not bounded in that small compasse and limit of time, but extended also unto us and to our posterity. For God therefore granted them a longer continuance, for revealing of many hidden mysteries

series, especially in Astrologie ; for the course of many of the celestiall bodyes could never have been learned, no not so much as in any mediocrity. had not God given some of them at least fixe hundred yeares to live in, in which time, the great yeare as they call it, is fulfilled and perfected. To which we may adde the fewnesse of the earths inhabitants in the beginning of the world, God preventing the dispeopling of the new world, and providing for its store and replenishing. And yet (if we beleewe *Anacron*, I know not how credible a witnesse being a Poet) within these few ages last past, *Argantbonius* King of the *Tartessians*, lived an hundred and fifty yeares ; *Cinyras* of *Cyprus*, an hundred and sixtie yeares ; *Eginus* two hundred ; and as *Alexander* and *Cornelius* report, there was one in *illyrium* called *Dodon*, that lived the full and compleat tearme of fixe hundred yeares ; and *Xenophon* writeth of one, who in the Isle of the *Latines* lived eight hundred yeares. But I am of opinion with *Pliny*, that it is very unlikely, seeing it may bee that they erred in their computation, not knowing how according to diversity of nations in former ages, there were manifold and sundry measures of the yeares ;

yeeres; for the old Arcadians made foure yeeres of one of ours, allotting unto every yeere three moneths. The *Egyptians* made as many yeeres as moneths, according to the Moones finished and renewed course: and according unto this reckoning, it will be no strange thing, that a man should even in these dayes live a thousand yeeres. But not to prosecute the divers continuance of things in divers kinds, as also to let passe the farther examination of the decayed estate of mans life, lest wee againe revive the now quenched fire of godlesse indignation, at the shortnesse of our life, we wil come to the most pertinent comparison of man with man in this kinde, if first we shall onely remember what was *Plinies* opinion of the shortning our lives, namely, that God herein did greatly gratifie us; by cutting off these dayes of misery, agreeable to which, *Silemus* being demanded what was the greatest happinesse and good that God could doe a man, made answer, *Never to be borne;* and the next unto that, *to dye quickly.*

But touching the causes of long life, wee may thus briefly dischotomise them, for they are eyther inward or outward; the inward causes are such as eyther we have naturally

rally ingrafted, or else gotten by Art, industry and wisdom: that of nature is the good temperature and proportionate mixture of the foure first qualities in the body; for moderate heat that is unproportionate to the quantity of moysture, rather hastneth death by the too speedy consumption of its moyst food, than any way prolongeth life, as we see in men of cholericke constitution. So also, too great colde, that is overswaying the quantity or vertue of our naturall heat, shortneth our life: and thence it is that old men the neerer they draw unto theyr ends, have their bodies overgrowne with cold: whereupon all the Astrologians have obserued *Saturne* to be a Planet Enemy unto life, as having a vertue of cold and drought, and accordingly (as some imagine) was he painted with a sicke in his hand, cutting downe as it were, and killing men with the operation and infusion of these two deadly qualities: which may also be sayd of the excessse of the other two contrary qualities, moysture and drought; for too much moysture oppresseth the naturall heat, as we see greene-wood quench an unequall quantity of fire: and thence it is, that Willowses and such like, whose almost naturall place is the Rivers side,

side, are of short continuance, because they too much and too waterish moisture drowneth their heat. So that hereby (as I take it) it is manifest, that none of these qualities singly and by themselves, are true causes of long life, but joyntly all in a good and iust proportion.

Now if any man shall (out of *Aristotle*) object, that the two qualities of life, namely *heat* and *moysture*, are onely causes of long life; we may answer, that these two by themselves procure not length of life, but is a certain measure & proportion. Now the rebater of the heates too too active quality, is his contrary, cold; and the *moderator* and *temperer* of the moistures access is drought: so that in every man the foure first qualities are requisite; yet were two onely mentioned by *Aristotle*, as being those onely which directly cause long life; the other two onely inclusively set downe, as being no otherwise effectually profitable for life, than as they temper and abate the excesse of the two principall. But because every moysture is not cause of life, nor the best moysture in every quantity, there are one or two requisite conditions annexed: first concerning the quality, that it be not too thinne and fluid,
such

such as is the naturall disposition of water ; but more cleaving and fat, such as may resemble the nature of oyle, for its better preservation from putrifaction : secondly, that it have some competent degree of heat, to keepe it from congealing ; last of all, that it be pure, not mingled with excrementall superfluities ; forasmuch as all mixture of superfluities is against nature, enemy to good digestion, and sound nutrition. Those things thus observed, our moysture shall be sufficiently qualified for our lives maintenance. Touching the quantity, in a word, (as is before sayd) it must neyther bee excessive, lest the too great quantity oppresse our heat, as wee see infusion of too much oyle oftentimes puts out the Lampe; nor yet defective, lest the devouring action of our heat, too soone consume it : but in a competent mediocrity, such as the heat may neyther over-hastily vanquish, nor with the violence of excessive inequality too suddenly be extinguished. Where briefly we may see the reason, why man is longer lived than other Creatures of more vast bodyes ; for though in the large capacitie of theyr great receivers, they have a greater quantity of this naturall moysture than is incident unto

unto mans small body, yet have they it not so well tempered and proportioned to their heat, which may well bee gathered by their slowe and seldome breathing. So that it is true which the Philosopher hath, that the great or litle quantity of the body, is no sufficient cause of long life. And yet this is withall most true, that where there is greatest store of humidity with a competent proportion of heat, there is greatest fitnessse naturally for long life. And that is the reason why those that in their infancy are most subject to a languishing diseasednesse, are afterward most healthfull, and for the most part longest lived. For the abundance of their naturall moysture hindreth the too speedy prevailing of the heat, by resisting its action: and so is it the lesse mingled with forren impurities. For as we see the Smiths fire, by the moderate sprinkling of water, though at first for a time its force is somewhat abated, yet at length having overcome its weake adversary, as in triumph burneth the cleerer, and lasteth longer; so fareth it in our bodies: for our heat not able on the sudden to overway our multitude of moisture, is the longer hindred from consuming it, whence proceedeth long life,

life, and after it hath gotten the upper hand, performeth with more facility its naturall functions, whence commeth healthfulnesse; where we may also explaine that *Problem*: why children that are too ripe witted in their childhood, are for the most part eyther shortest lived, or else toward their old age most sottish, according to our Proverbe; *Soone ripe, soone rotten*: for hence wee may gather, that from the beginning they had but little moysture, over which theyr heat soone prevayled: for much humidity is cause of blockishnesse and folly; whence is that of *Galen*, that *fleame being a cold Waterish humour, is of no force for ornament of good conditions*: and *Plato* doubted not to say, that looke how much moisture there is in us, so much also is our folly; and therefore it is as the same *Plato* observeth, that children and women are for the most part most foolish. For the glorious light and Sunne-like splendor of the soule, is therewith as a with a cloud obscured and intercepted, which is an evident prooffe of the small store of moysture in these quick-witted forward children, over which the heat so much the sooner obtaining dominion, and in processe of time drying the braine, the subordinate instru-

ment

ment of understanding, eyther quite destroyeth it, and so bringeth death, or else so corrupts it, that it is altogether unable and unfit to steed the inner senses in their functions, whereon the understanding in this prison of the body principally dependeth: which may no lesse fitly serve for answer unto that consequent demand, why those infants for the most part are soonest able to walke, to talke, to conceive, to remember, and such like; the reason is taken from the little quantity of moysture; which may bee gathered by the contrary disposition in the otherwise affected subiects, as also by that which we see in daily experience in creatures of other kinds. For whereas man by reason of his fluid, unsetled substance, hath for the better strengthening of his joynts his body swathed, and is a long time before he is able to stand or walke, or performe any such like his vitall functions; we see other Creatures almost in the same moment, borne and imbled to stand, walke, and such like; for theyr unequall quantity of heat, prevayling over the little store of moysture; soone fitteth them for the performance of vitall actions, that being the Soules chiefe instrument in the discharge of her duties. Now if any man
shall

shall aske what this iust proportion is, and when they are tempered so as may best be a-vaileable for long life, the answer is, that heat and moysture are then well proportioned when neyther the moysture with its too great quantity devoureth the heat, nor the overmuch heat, too suddenly consumes and eateth up the moisture. Yet must the heat have a kind of dominion over the moisture, else can it not be able to nourish the body. For in nutrition the thing nourished, by reason of the instrument ordained for that purpose, must actually worke upon that, whereby it is nourished. And because that every Agent must be proportioned unto the patient, in the inequality of excesse, therefore must the heat being the soules sole active instrument of nutrition, have dominion over the moysture, the subiect matter of that faculty.

Touching the complexions, the question is, which of them is best disposed and fitted for length of life. To take that for granted which *Fernelius* doubteth of, namely, that there are foure, if not only yet chiefly, notable complexions; we answer that those of a sanguine constitution are by nature capable of the longest life; as having the two quali-

ties of life best tempred. And therefore is compared unto the aire, which is moderately hot and in the highest degree moyst. Yet not with that too thinne and fluid warrish moisture, but more oyle; oyle it selfe resembling the true nature of the ayre. Therefore the sanguine complexion is fittest for long life. For choler is an humor like unto fire, extreame hot, and moderately drye, and so insufficient to make supply of moysture to the devouring operation of that fiery heat, which is in it. In the flegmaticke the copiousnesse of that humour resembling water, oppresseth the hear, and so hindreth good digestion, whence proceed crudities in the stomacke and liver, from whence they are diffused into the veynes, and so unto all the parts of the body, and at length the body is overgrowne with corruption. Lastly, melancholy resembling the earth and its qualities, cold and drought, both enemies to life, hasteneth the destruction of the body whereunto it is incident.

The second inward cause of long life is, the moderation of our affections. Whether it be that naturall appetite of *meat* and *drinke* for nourishment, or those other of *anger*, *love*, *joy*, *lust*, *sorrow*, and such like. For all these are
availe-

availeable both wayes, eyther in excesse to kill, or in moderation to save. Touching the moderate use of meats and drinckes, what need we seeke farre for prooffe of its profitablenes to preserve life, when we see so many daily by surfeiting and overcharging their stomacks with too much and too riotous use of meates, untimely end theyr dayes: and contrariwise, men very crasie and sickely by temperancie and moderation many times protract their lives almost to an incredible length? For so it is reported of one *Herodiscus*, a student in *Aristotle* his dayes, the most weake and sickly of any that lived in that time by the testimony both of *Plato* & of *Aristotle*; who notwithstanding, by his diligent care and guidance of himselfe lived full out 100. yeares; and no marvell, for so did he repayre the dayly decay of his humidity, by supply of nourishment, and neyther overwhelmed his heat, with the abundance of moysture; nor mingled his radicall moysture with too much externall superfluous impurities. Where we may resolve that doubt, how it comes to passe; *that often drinkers of Wine for the most part hasten their death*; The reason is, that the vehement heat of the wine, consumeth theyr moysture, and so by detraction

of the heats food, in time also extinguisheth the heat. Now if any man shall require me to prescribe a dyet unto him; though I be no Physitian, yet will I referre him unto that of the excellent Emperour, who never eat till he was hungry, nor ever proceeded to a glutting satiety, For the extreames are dangerous both *excesse* and *defect*; too much meate hindring good digestion and ingendring crudities, & too little giving occasion of the heats too sudden prevayling over the moisture, both which are friends of death: Nor would I counsell men strictly to tye themselves unto set houres; for that, sayth *Paracelsus* is dangerous, causing many times, eyther delay of applying nourishment, or too speedy ministring before the former digestion is finished.

26

And heere we may seasonably annexe the use of exercise, for that is a thing very availeable to digestion; dispersing the nourishment into the parts of the body, and being (as it were) the bellowes to kindle & reniue our naturall heate: for overmuch rest and ceasing from motion cooleth the body. And as the elementish fire which we use, unlesse it bee sometime blowne and fed as it were with aire is extinguished: so our naturall

all heat without exercise and motion is after a sort cast on sleepe, or rather benumbed, whence proceedeth that other daughter of dulnesse, *collection of excremental superfluities*, the heat being not able to digest our received nourishment; & thence is that corruption and rottennesse which overtaketh these slow-backes; as we see standing water soonest putrisie and gather filth. Wherefore *Aristotle* enquiring the causes of the *royesome travell of some women in child-birth over others*, setteth down this as principall among the rest, namely their idlenesse and want of exercise; for his experience of women in other Countries so accustomed to paines taking, had taught him; for to them child-bearing was not so painefull, their labour consuming those excrements that are the usuall impediments of ease in that kinde. Nor will I take upon me to limit any man to any kind of exercise rather than an other, or appoint any time; although this caveat will not be amisse prescribed, that they use not to stirre themselves more violently than is ordinary before the through digestion of meate; for then they clogge their stomacks and make them unfit for after concoction, and withall fill their bodyes with raw humors, which by

exercise are disperſed through the veines into all the parts of the body : onely as in other things, ſo eſpecially in exerciſe of what kind ſoever, eyther for delight, or of paynes, let them remember *moderation*, that it be neither too much, nor too little. Not too much, that is, neyther too vehement, nor yet continuall, but inter changeable, for both theſe by conſuming of the ſpirits, are alike hurtfull ; not too little, for continued reſt and idleneſſe (as is aforeſayd) engendreth putrifaction. Where the conſideration of the moderate uſe of ſleepe and waking is very incident, for they are both things neceſſary for maintenance of life in their mediocrity, both as hurtfull if beyond meaſure. For immoderate and unſeaſonable watching waſteth the Spirits, and by conſuming of the vitall iuyce, cauſeth leanneſſe in the body, enfeebleth the parts thereof, hindreth the operation of the ſenſes, dryeth the marrow and the braine : inſomuch that oftentimes it proceedeth to doting and frenſie. So likewiſe too much ſleepe hindreth our health and well-fare by looſing the parts of the body, dulling the naturall heat, conſuming the moyſture, and ſuch like. But moderately uſed and interchangeably they are notable meanes of procuring

curing and preserving health, not onely because this variety and change is very delightful and refreshing, but much more by restoring or hindring the decay of Nature.

Now touching these other affections, as *anger, ioy, sorrow*, and such like, though we read not of many that have suddainly dyed for anger, yet by reason of that sudden emission of heat into the outward parts of the body, and kindling as it were the fire of choler, it must needs be very hartfull, when as all suddennesse, especially joyned with vehemency is an horroir unto nature. And choler inflameth the bloud, whence proceedeth that unreasonablenes and raging, usually observed in men: overmuch angred. But examples are plentiful of such as with sudden and immoderate joy have dyed; as *Pliny* reports of *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the Sicilian Tyrant, that immediately upon tydings of victory gave up the Ghost. And *Livie* maketh mention of two mothers at Rome, that after the bloody battell of *Cannae*, for joy of the safe and unexpected returne of their Sonnes, suddenly fell downe dead: the one meeting her sonne at the City gate, the other in her house bewayling the reported death of her

sonne, when on the sudden beside her expectation, safely presented himselfe to her sight. The like also *Gellius* writeth of one *Diogenes* of Rhodes, that having his three Sons, for the mastery obtained at the games, in one day crowned, after his sonnes imbracements and the peoples applause, suddenly yeelded up the Ghost. The meanes of this death, was the sudden dilatation of the heart, the vitall spirits and the heat whose beginning is the heart, being too farre caried from theyr fountaine. So also read wee of *Aristotle*, that not able to finde the reason why *Enripus* (a part of the sea scituated betweene *Aulis* of *Roetia* and *Eubaa*) ebbed & flowed seven times a day, for very grieve dyed: the means and maner of his death being the too great contraction of the spirits, wherby the heat was as it were with smoke choaked. The like is reported of *Dionacrus* a Logician, who for shame that he could not at the first answer the trifling question which *Sisyphus* put out, suddenly ended his dayes. Which is also written of *Homer*, who in the *Ile Ios* sitting on the Sea shore, demanded of the fisher-men if they had taken any thing, they thus obscurely in riddle-wise made answer; *Those that we tooke we left behind, those*
that

that we could not catch, we bring with vs. For in the sun-shine (as they say it is shipmens fashions) they made inquisition for their back-biting familiars, and some they tooke and cruelly pressed unto death, leaving their livelesse carcases to bee devoured of the fishes: those that craftily had insinuated themselves eyther into their flesh, or into the inside of their apparell, they were faine to bring away with them. But quicke witted *Homer*, not able on the suddaine to expound this Probleme, for shame, (as *Plutarch* and *Herodotus* write of him) gave up the Ghost. For the spirits and bloud (as in all kinde of feare it faileth out) retiring to the inward parts, as to a Tower of defence, by their sudden retreat, and reverberation, redouble the heate and so inflaming the heart not able to be cooled againe by respiration, stifles the Patient.

Concerning Venery, deaths best harbinger, I shall not need to recite the infinite examples of them, that by meanes thereof haue hastened their deaths, nor indeed is it possible to number those innumerable troupes that through lust eyther before the actuall accomplishment, or after the too frequent satisfying the same have ended their youthfull dayes. It was well sayd of one, that *Venus* provides

provideth not for these that are already borne, but for those that shall be borne, and therefore *Avicenna*, a learned *Philosopher* and *Physitian*, doubted not to say, that the emission of a little seed more than the body could well beare was a great deale more hurtfull than the losse of forty times so much blood. For it weakeneth the Spirits, weakneth the stomack, enfeebleth and dryeth up the braine and marrow, whereby especially it hastneth death. And the truth heereof *Aristotle* proveth by his experimentall observation, for so hath he noted the Cock-sparrow by immoderate and too frequent use of Venery, very seldome to live out the tearme of two yeares, and the same reason hee giveth why the Mule a mixt creature begotten betweene an horse & an asse is longer lived, than either of them, for his insting in that kinde, is but once only through the whole course of his life. To which we may adde the diversity of the sex, for the male according unto *Aristotle* in every kind almost, is by nature better fitted for long life than the female, having greater force of heat, and the moisture more firme & better able to resist than the fluid substance of the female; and thence it is that women for the most part are sooner perfected than men,

men, being sooner fit for generation, sooner in the flower and prime of their age, and finally sooner old, for their heat though little, yet sooner prevayleth over that fluid thinne substance and moysture of theyrs, than it possibly can over that solid and compact humidity which is in man.

But lest our Treatise grow too big, we will proceed to those other outward causes of long life, such as be the influences of the Stars, either in our conception and birth, or in the country & soile wherein we live, as also the goodnesse of the Soyle it selfe, both of the Earth & Ayre. For though it be true that the celestially bodies have no direct action either of inclination or constraint upon the reasonable Soule of man, which is immateriall, yet is it as true that they have singular and especially operations upon our bodies; for so we see the fruitfulnessse and barrennessse of the Earth depends upon the heavens good and bad aspect; the Sea followes the motion and alteration of the Moone, the yeere distinguished into its foure parts, according to the accessie or farther absence of the Sun; and therefore *Galen*, the father of Physitians, counselled his Schollers to have especiall respect unto the conjunction
of

of the Planets in their signes, whensoever they undertake any cure: and, which is more fit for the present purpose, the Astrologers have assigned unto every Planet a monthly dominion over the child conceived in the wombe, according to their order and scituation. The first Moneth is allotted unto *Saturne*: the second unto *Iupiter*, and so forth in order, untill they have all finished their dominion, and then they begin againe: which is the especiall reason alleaged by some, why the child that is borne in the eight moneth, for the most part dyeth, when as oftentimes those that are brought forth a Moneth sooner or later, live in very good health: for *Saturne* is a Planet whose influence causeth cold and drynesse, which both are qualities enemies unto life. Now followeth the last, though not the least cause of long life, and that is the goodnesse of the soyle, and wholsomnesse of the ayre; for it is so recorded in Histories, and approved by the testimonie of our late travellers, that in that part of *India* which is called *Oner*, the inhabitants are very long lived, and for the most part very healthfull, insomuch that many of them live untill they bee above an hundred yeeres old; and wee see by experience

ence in our Country, how perilous not onely pestilent aire is, but even the unwholsomnes of the fenny Countryes, that are often annoyed with stinking and unsavory fogges. *Aristotle* in his treatise of the length and shortnesse of life, maketh choyce of a hot Country, as fittest for preservation and maintenance of life; for so he observeth it, that serpents bred and brought up in hot Countries, are generally bigger bodyed then those that are found in colder climets: and those fishes that breed in the red Sea, are also longer than those in the Seas which are not so hot, and that, though they bee of the same kinde; which is a manifest proove of theyr longer continuance: else how commeth it to passe, that they have greater growth? and againe, those Creatures that live in cold climates, have a more waterish kinde of humour, and fitter for congelation; whence followeth the speedyer destruction of the inhabitants: but the truth is, that neyther hot Countries, nor colder climates, are of themselves any furtherance unto long life, for those that are of a cholericke fiery constitution, live longer in cold Countries, and such as be of colder complexion, live best and longest in hot regions, but according

to the diversity of mens complexions, so live they better or worse in divers countries. Those that are too hot of constitution by my counsell shall make choyce of a Country in some measure and degrees cold, lest the outward heat of the circumjacent ayre increase the fire within, and make it more vehement; and thence is it that those in the hottest part of *Ethiopia* are shortest lived, having that naturall excesse of heate set on fire with the accesse of the externall heate of the ayre. Now for such as abound with too much moysture, their best habitation in my judgement is in hot and drie regions, that the heat and drought of the Soyle, may abate the superfluity of the humor. But there are some of a moderate and well proportioned constitution, and if any man shall aske what country is best for them to dwell in, I answer that there are two sorts of men thus tempered; some are of a more weake and lesse hardy disposition, and to them I would prescribe a dwelling in countries rather hot the cold, that the heat of the place may comfort and strengthen the heat of theyr bodies. Others againe are more hardy & better able to indure any not extreame violence of cold; and for them it is best to live in colder Climates,

mates, for so is their heat better inabled to performe its functions of digestion, and such like; and therefore *Aristotle* in his Politicks sayth; that Northren men, and generally such as dwell in colder Countries, are stronger and bigger bodyed, and most an end better couraged, and longer lived: for the coldnesse of the compassing ayre, reflects the heat into the inward parts, and by that reflection, the heats force is increased, and the parts gathered better and closer together, which both further the performance of its duties. And that is the reason why men in Winter are more hungry and devouring than in Summer, as experience teacheth us all: for the stomacke is strengthened by the heats compression, to the better concocting of the received nourishment. Thus therefore may wee conclude with the exposition of *Aristotle* his opinion in this case, when he sayth, that hot places are fittest for long life, in his booke of the *Length and shortnesse of mans life*; and in his Politicks, *The inhabitants of colder Climates, are stronger and longer lived*: for thus may we reconcile this apparent contradiction: that for men of more cold complexions, hot places are most preservative and healthfull;
and

and for the contrary complexioned men, contrary affected places; so that, if two of the same constitution (imagine them both to be hot) live, the one in a cold, the other in an hot Region (if their heat was not accordingly proportioned to their moisture, but unequally in the excess) he that made choyce of the colder habitation, provided best for his life. And thus have wee briefly set downe the common received causes of long life, where-out by the consequence of contraries wee may deduce the causes of short life. And they are, first the small quantity and watrishnesse of the moisture. Secondly, the superfluous abundance of excrements. Thirdly, the badnesse and unwholesomnesse of the Soyle. Fourthly, the ungentle aspects of the Starres, that ruled eyther in our conception or birth. Fifthly, want of good nourishment. Sixthly, intemperance eyther in our dyet, or exercise, or obeying of our affections. To which some adde the fewnesse or tendernesse of Teeth, for that is a signe of thicknesse in the Bone of the head, the matter allotted to the teeths generation being turned into the substance of the scull, which also importeth the weaknesse of the Braine, which is by means thereof

of unfit for breathing, and therefore being of a moist disposition, the more fit for putrefaction, as standing waters soonest putrifie and gather filth: but this I take rather for a signe then a cause of short life.

Now come we to that we first and principally intended, to shew the differences of mens ages, and the causes thereof, together with their severall and singular properties, wherein we will deale so much the more sparingly by reason of those doubts and difficulties removed in the former part of the treatise, so that we shall not need to digresse into any by-controversies but keepe a direct and a straight course. And to begin with the *Definition* (for more orderly proceeding) it may thus briefly be described: *An age is a period and tearme of mans life, wherein his naturall complexion and temperature naturally and of its owne accord is evidently changed.* For such is the disposition and nature of our body, that by the continuall combat and interchangable dominion of the ever-iarring elements, it often changeth its primary constitution, so that though there were no outward cause of transmutatiō, which notwithstanding are many and manifold; yet have wee that home-bred cause within us that

would in time alter our temperature, for our naturall heat unceſſantly working upon our naturall moiſture doth, though not ſuddenly, change the proportion into extremes, yet by degrees perceivably prevaileth more and more over the humidity. For ſo ſee we the ſame body in our youth and child-hood, diverſly tempered, our *infancy* full of moiſture, as the fluid ſoft ſubſtance of our fleſh manifeſtly declarcth: our *Youth* bringeth a farther degree of ſolidity: our *riper age* ever temperate: thence ſtill declineth our body unto cold and dryneſſe, till at length death ceaſeth upon our bodies, being the laſt end and period of our life. But every ſlight change of the ſoure qualities proportion changeth not our temperature, for then we ſhould every day have a divers complexion, our bodies eſtſoones with wine and exerciſe changed from cold to heat, and by the contrary from heat to cold: yet by reaſon of the ſhort indurance of theſe diſtemperatures, the body returning to its former conſtitution, we cannot ſay there is a new complexion wrought in the body: for a temperature or complexion is *a firme and ſtanding habit of the body*. Nor yet muſt wee imagine the talneſſe and growing of the body on the new budding of haire,

haire, to be causes sufficient to procure this distinction; but the variation of our originall constitution, is the true and proper cause of this diversity and difference. And yet not every change of the complexion, but that onely which proceedeth from that inwardly ingendred cause of destructions; for many times by the unseasonable and immoderate heat of the ayre, as also by intemperate and riotous living men even in the most mild & temperate countries, alter theyr complexions, and with the *Ethiopian*, become even decrepit old men (if we respect theyr constitutions, and those other incident qualities of old age) before they have finished the full teame of thirty yeeres; and therefore was it added in the description, that it must be a naturall and a selfe-alteration. Now according to the naturall and evident alterations of heat and moistures proportion, so may we best and most properly divide the ages. *Pythagoras* diuides the into foure kinds or rather setteth down their number, which be according to his reckoning foure in number, *Child-hood*, *Youth*, *Man-hood*, *Old age*, proportioning our life to the foure parts of the yeere, our *Child-hood* to the *Spring*, wherein all things together with a pleasant verdour/

and greenenesse flourish and by a plentiful supply of moisture continually increase in growth. Our *Youth* unto *Summer*, for that growne strength of the body and minde. Our *Man-age* unto the *Autumne* or *Harvest*, when after the manifold turmoyles and dangers of our fore-spent life, the good gifts and indowments of our minde (as we see it fall out in the fruits of Nature) receive a kind of seasonable and kindly ripenesse. Our *old Age* he resembleth unto the colde and troublesome *Winter season*, very fitly thereby expressing the cumbersome coldnesse of the latter end of our life. *Aristotle* setteth downe onely three distinct ages, *Child-hood*, *flourishing Man-age*, and *Old-age*; the first plentifully abounding with heat and moisture; the middle age having the same two qualities of life, as well tempered as theyr nature possibly can be; old age declining and swarving from that good and moderate temper, and by little and little decaying in both these qualities, till at length they be both of them consumed. Now that our life is thus often, and thus in order changed in the temperature, it will easily appeare, if we consider the matter whereof we are all made, and that is *semen & sanguis parentum*, both abounding

ding with heat and moyſture, whereout ariſeth this Conſequence, that in the firſt entrance into life, wee have greateſt ſtore of thoſe two lively qualities, which decay not but by length of time, and that in our Infancy wee are fullſt of moyſture, our experience and ſenſe teacheth us, for ſo wee ſee infants fleſh moſt fluid and almoſt of a waxen diſpoſition, ready to receive impreſſion of any light touch; and as for heat, *Galen* and *Hippocrates* both conſent, that *man is moſt hot in the firſt day of his birth*, though by reaſon of the great ſtore of moyſture, the heats power doth not ſo evidently appeare: and becauſe the heat without any the leaſt intermiſſion or pause, worketh upon our moyſture, and by little and little conſumeth it, it ſelfe alſo in time decaying, who ſeeth not that the beſt part of our life, even neceſſarily is moſt cold and dry? Whence alſo this may be inferred; that the ſpace betweene the two extreames, is moſt temperate, forasmuch as *Nature never paſſeth from one extreme unto the other, but by the meane*: and this is the warrant of *Aristotles* tripartite diſiſion of ages; the ſeverals are thus briefly defined.

Childhood is the firſt part and age of a mans life, wherein their generation and growth is per-

jected, and this lasteth (for the most part) un-
 till wee be five and twenty yeeres old; and
 this age is proportionable unto the *Spring*,
 hot and moyst, for in this time our naturall
 heat supplyeth great store of vitall aerie
 moysture, from the nourishment received,
 than was spent of that our naturall store;
 & thence it is, that within compasse of this
 time, our bodies grow bigger and taller. But
 according to the successeive decay and dimi-
 nution of our heat and moysture, it hath
 pleased *Arriquiry* to point out certaine de-
 grees of this first age; the first is our Infan-
 cie, and that lasteth untill the third or fourth
 yeere of our life, and is alwayes best stored
 with moisture: the next is our Boy-hood,
 and that lasteth other five yeeres: the third
 our *budding* and *blossoming age*, when our
 cheekes and other more hidden parts begin
 to be cloathed with that mossie excrement
 of haire, which is prorogued untill the eigh-
 teenth yeere: the last our *youth*, lasting un-
 till we be five and twenty yeeres old; and
 these are the parts of our growing age. The
 next is our *Flourishing* and *middle age*, and
 this is, when a man is come to the highest
 degree of perfection in the temper of his
 body, & continueth in that flourishing live-
 liness

linesse, without any notorious decay or impaying his heat, supplying the just quantity of moysture from the nourishment, which in the former action of it, was consumed; and this is compared to the *Summer*, hot and dry, or rather moderately moyst, dry onely in comparison of the former age, not simply, lest the heat should too soone dissolve the body; and this also hath it parts; the first is our *Youth*, for so (the penury of our English tongue warranteth me to call it) when our growth is stayed, and our naturall heat beginneth to be most flourishing; you may call it our *Prime*, for then indeed are we in our prime and most flourishing estate; it lasteth from the five and twentieth to the five and thirtieth or fortieth yeare of our life: the second part of our middle age, is our *Manhood*, the most constant and settled part of our life, as having our life-qualities most firme and in greatest mediocrity, wherein notwithstanding our naturall heat beginnes a little to decay and decline from its vigour; yet so, as it cannot by sense be perceived, and this lasteth oftentimes till we be fiftie yeeres old. The last is *Old-age*, when not onely the augmentative faculty of the Soule ceaseth to increase the quan-

erty of our bodies, but also by reason of our heats and moystures decay, there is a manifest declining from our former lustinesse and livelihood, our bodily strength together with the weake and feeble operations of our Soule in her functions sensibly impayred. And this last part of our life is resembled unto *Winter*, for that although it be in it selfe hot and moyst, (as life consisteth wholly in these two qualities) yet in comparison of the former ages, and in regard of death, unto which it leadeth us, is accounted cold, and this hath also its degrees or parts: the first wherein our strength and heat are evidently impayred, yet not so much, but that there remaineth a will and readinesse to bee doing; and this lasteth usually from our fiftieth yeere unto our three-score and five. The second part of this last part of our life, which they call decrepit old age, is when our strength and heat is so farre decayed, that not onely all ability is taken away, but even all willingnesse, to the least strength and motion of our body: and this is the conclusion and end of our life, resembling death it selfe, whose harbinger and fore-runner it is: and so haue we seven severall parts of our life, comprising our *Pubertatem* and *adulescentiam*,

scntiam, under one : accordingly whereto the Astrologers have assigned to every of them theyr peculiar predominant Planet : our *Infant* age is allotted to the *Moones* milde and moyst dominion, cherishing us with her sweet influence which she hath especially upon moyst bodies : our *Boy-hood*, *Mercury* hath charge over, inclining vs to *sportfulnesse, talke, and learning* : *Venus* guides our blossoming *lustfull age* : our youthfull *prime*, by the *Sunnes* lively operation is lifted up from base delights, to a loftyer and more man-like resolution and livelineffe. *Mars* the sterne God of warre, hath the precincts of his dominion limited within compasse of our *Man-age*, adding courage to our livelihood, and whetting our otherwise dull spirits, unto a more ventrous boldnesse in quarrelling combats : *Old age* from *Iupiter* receiveth gravitie and stayednesse : *Decrepit crooked age*, from the angry aspect of dry *Saturne*, sucketh the poysonous infirmities of crasie sicknesse, and wayward pettishnesse : and this is briefly the summary, explication of the differences of mans ages, and the causes of this distinction, together with those properties which the Astrologians mystically and darkely have propounded,

ded, as proper and peculiar to every and all of them, to which if we adde the exposition of some few Problems incident to this Treatise, wee will presently annex our Epilogue,

32

The first doubt is, *What the reason may be of our crying and lamenting at our very first entrance into the world.* There are that attribute this mourning unto a divining, and naturall foreseeing as it were of the calamities to come: but I rather thinke it riseth from those infirmities and griefes which we presently feele, as well for want of some good thing which we desire, as also for some mislike and grievance of some incumbent miserie: as first, that violent motion from that before so quietly injoyed Bed (as it were) in the wombe. Secondly, the straight narrowness of that passage by which we enter into the world. Thirdly, the cold and hungry entertainment which we have, driven out of our warme harbour, in the close imperceivable habitation of our Mothers Wombe, and barred of that nourishment which we before had uncessantly ministred unto us; and thence is it, that presently we betake our selves to that *Daryhouse* of Nature, even by a naturall instinct and direction,

on, where when we have well battled our selves, & by the enwrapping in our clothes, are armed against the cold ayres injuries, our begunne lamentations are pacified and turned into a quiet contentednesse.

Secondly, it may be demanded, *Why Children in their sucking age are naturally more given unto sleepe, then when they be of more ripenes.* The reason is, Natures Mother-like providence that for the better strengthening and speedier perfection of her offspring, useth this as a meanes to increate the vertue and operation of the heat, and for that purpose hath stored their head with moist vapours, fitted through their rarity and thinnesse, for the braines coole operation upon them. For as united forces are strongest, eyther for assault or resistance, so the scattering discontinuity of the thin vapors is an occasion of the coldes easier impression, and so of their thickning & better stopping of the passages of the spirits unto the outward senses. Another cause may be, the braines coldnesse, as having in so little time received no great annoyance from the stomackes distemperature, it selfe also abounding with moisture & fit matter for procuring of sleepe. Thirdly, the good digestion of that mild milkie sub-

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stance, whence ascendeth into the head the soundest and most pure exhalations. And therefore are their sleepes (for the most part) without any the least painefulnesse and molestation, whereas contrarily we see surcharged stomackes breed unquiet sleepes.

34

Thirdly, the question may be, *Why the naturall vitall actions, as nutrition, augmentation, and such like, are in Infants so powerfull, and those other of sense so feeble and uneffettuall.* The answer is, that the good performance of those actions of life dependeth principally upon our naturall heat; For our Soule, the prince of our body hath assigned to our heat the administration and ordering of that province: no marvell therefore if those duties be well performed in our infancy, when the author of them is at that time most powerfull and plentifull. Now the reason of the senses weak operation is the fewnesse of spirits deputed to that function: for the instrumentall spirits of sense being to be made in the shop or worke-house of the braine by the braine, that excellent spirituall artificer, the workeman howsoever he bee his craftmaster, as having beene Natures *Apprentice*, yet by reason of his imbecility and weakenesse, is not able in so short space to make

make many or at least not so forceable instruments, as may serue for the high function & duty of the Soule. To which we may adde the aboundance of moysture, wherewith the celles of the braine are in our infancy overflowne hindring the actions of the Soules sensitive parts, and dulling her thereto ordained faculties.

Where also we have opportunity to resolve a fourth doubt, *why children have so slippery and short memories.* The reason thereof is, their braines too great humidity, whereby it is disabled to keepe the impressions of the outward senses objects. For there are two especiall annoyances of the braine that hinder our memorative faculties, immoderate drynesse and too great moysture. For the exceise of drought causeth exceise of hardnes to resist the impressions. And therefore it is, that old men for the most part have so bad memories, their naturall moysture being by the heats long continued operation almost wasted. And *Galen* in his treatise of the *Memories, failing because of drynesse*, maketh mention of a *Student*, that through immoderate watching and studiousnesse had so excessively dried his braine, that he had almost quite lost his remembrance : as also of a husbandman

bandman that by too much paines in that his painefull vocation, and the slenderesse of hungry fare, was in danger of the like forgetting inconvenience. And as drinesse by not admitting the impression, is an impediment to the memory, so is also too much moysture by not preserving the imprinted species. For so see we water, howsoever most yeelding, yet least fit to retaine any figure imprinted. Children therefore so moyst brained, must needs be short remembranced.

36

The next question is, *Whether speech bee naturall or wholy from discipline.* The answer is, that it is naturall, as vertue and other good habits be, nature having given a disposition and fitnesse, together with instruments fit for that purpose. But as waxe howsoever capable of any impression by reason of its pliable nature, yet without the putting to of some outward Seale, hath no actuall print or resemblance of any thing; so our nature, though as fit to receive any thing taught as wax is to receive impression from the Seale, yet without the helpe of some outward instructor, is not actually and fully indowed with any how proper soever a quality, especially such as are auailable for knowledge. In the which kind this of speech hath a speciall prerogative;

prerogative; but lest I should seeme to bee needlessly busied in this question, I referre the Reader for his farther satisfaction to that excellent French Poet *Du Bartas*, in his *Babylon*, Englished by Master *William Lisle*.

A sixth question is, *Why Children in theyr infancy have no actuall evident use of theyr reason.* The cause is, the abundance of moisture incident to that age, whereby the functions of the inward senses as with a cloud are either obscured, or else quite hindered; whence was that fore mentioned speech of the learned *Plato*, *That there is a little mixture of folly and moisture in men*: and therefore *Galen* was wont to say, that *flegme* the most waterish of all humors, was little or nothing profitable for the attainment of learning. In the seventh place it is demanded, *why Children most fretfull are usually shortest lived?* the reason is, theyr plenty of heat in comparison of their small store of moisture; for therefore are cholericke complexioned men most pettish, because their blood is by the fiery heat of that humor so soone inflamed: whereupon the *Egyptians* avouched the *Fly* to be the Hieroglyphick of anger, and pertinacity, because (as *Pierius* observeth) it is of

so cholericke and fierie a disposition, and we see in experience men in anger fiery coloured, which proceeds from their heats inflaming of the bloud. Now heat unproportioned unto the moysture (asis aforesayd) quickly consumeth that small store of moysture provided for its food and so procureth death.

38

To these may be added, that well knowne Probleme of *Aristotle*: why *Children breathe faster and with lesse intermission then doe better growne men*. The answer is, their great store of heat in comparison of that small measure in the after-ages, causeth nature for its better preservation, to draw the ayre oftner for the cooling of the hearts heat; and that is the reason that men who have beene any long time troubled with an *Ague*, or any such like distemperature, are alwayes very short winded; The contrary *Aristotle* witnesseth to follow, in things contrarily affected, for so he proveth the *Horse* and *Oxe* not to have so much heat in them; because they take not their breath so thicke together; implying that the cold temper of the heart and other inwards, is cause of longer breath; which is also evident in reason, for the attraction and emission of the ayre, being ordained

dained onely for the cooling and tempering of the hearts heat, according to the necessity thereof, must breathing be eyther oftner or more seldome. *What is the reason that in our youth we are more hungry, and have a greater desire of meat, than in our declining and elder ages?* The reason is, our sound and speedy digestion of fore-received nourishment performed by meanes of our naturall heat, whence ariseth a new sucking of the veynes, and so an incitement of the appetite.

Whence is it that old men are commonly so iudiciously suspicious? The cause is their incredulity and hardnesse of beliefe, which it selfe also proceedeth from their much experience of mens wilie practises, according to that, *The burnt child dreadeth the fire.* For such is the extreme badnesse of our nature, that still we go from one extreme unto another; and so become of men extreamely credulous, in our last age extreamely suspicious. And that indeed was *Aristotles* remedy, who to draw us from Covetousnesse, biddes vs incline vnto *Prodigality*; and yet onely with this condition, if we cannot at the first instant after our long custome in the one extreame, light upon the mediocrity betweene both. *What maketh them so foolishly devoted to the things*

of this World; that when they are neereſt unto death, they are moſt deſirous not onely to keepe that which before they had gotten, but more & more to increaſe their ſtore? The reaſon is given by *Ariſtotle* in his *Rhetoricks*: and it is their exceeding great deſire of life, even after thoſe many dayes which they have foreſpent. Whence proceedeth that other inordinate deſire of things neceſſary for life maintenance, they hauing in their experience obſerved how hardly things neceſſary are gotten, how eaſily alſo they are loſt. What is the cauſe, why *Old men are ſo talkative and full of Words*? Either becauſe nature loves to exerciſe that part moſt which is leaſt decayed: or that knowledge, the onely thing old age can bragge of, cannot be manifeſted, but by utterance: or that old men, the nigher they are to their end, they much more deſire to have their memory not onely by children and poſterity, but even by the ſpeeches and deedes fore-uttered, and performed in their life: or that wiſedome (as all good things naturally communicate their good properties) makes them deſirous to profit others.

39

Whence is that froſty hoarineſſe that ſuall lighteth vpon mens heads in the winter and coldeſt age of their life? There are ſome that im-

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gine it to proceed from the drineſſe of thoſe excrements: which alſo they goe about to proove by the like experiment in bones, which after their humor is drawne out by ſeething, grow more and more white, till at length they come unto a perfect and full whitenefſe. But the untrue reſolution of the doubt propounded, is thereby diſcovered, be- cauſe that men who uſe to cover their haire, are ſooner gray-headed than thoſe that uſe no covering, when as notwithstanding it is ma- niſeſt, that covered haire hath more ſtore of moiſture, than that which hath beene expo- ſed unto the injurious toſſing of the winde, and the ſcorching heat of the Sunne. There- fore I rather allow of *Ariſtoteles* reaſon, name- ly the putrifaction of that excrementall hu- mour, whereof our haire is made: for our naturall heat through its unintermitted ope- ration, being diſabled fully to digeſt that ex- crement ſent fiſt within to that outmoſt co- vering, our ſkin, for the haireſ nourishment, it putriſieth and corrupteth. Now that there is ſuch a rottenneſſe and putrifaction in the hayre, it is evident by experience of ſuch as by long ſickenefſe have become untimely gray-headed; for after the recovery of their diſeaſe, the feebleneſſe of their heate being

together with their health restored, the hayre receives its former flourishing and (that I may so speake) unwasted greenenesse, which restitution can be attributed unto no other cause but only to the through concoction of that undigested excrement by the restored heat. The like whereof we see also in corne and grasse, that having lost its flourishing greenenesse, by the continuall beating upon and overwhelming of the waters, afterward being by the Sunnes lively heat cherished and revived, resumeth its naturall vigour and viridity. And that this hoar-headednesse proceeds from a defect of heat, it is farther evidenced by a strange example recorded by *Scaliger*, of a man who in one nights space had his head overgrowne with hoarinesse. The cause was this. The Prince of *Mantova*, *Francis Gonzaga*, had upon suspicion of traiterous conspiracy, eyther against his person or state, imprisoned one of his kin & alliance, that for his age was wholly uncapable of that alteration: and upon the next morrow newes was brought unto the Prince, that his head was all upon the sudden growne hoarily gray, which almost miraculous alteration moved the Princes minde to grant him life and free use of his former liberty.

erty. Now if any man should demand the reason of this sudden change, it is given by the Philosophers, and is nothing else but the extremity of his griefe and feare, whence proceeded that withdrawing of the dispersed heat unto the inward parts, and so was the humorous nourishment of the haire for want of concoction turned into rotnenneſſe.

And thus have we briefly runneover the diversities of mans ages together with the true causes and properties of the particulars, having premised the determination of those usually incident controversies for our better and more direct proceeding in the principall treatise: not as *Prolegomena* or preface to the purpose, but as things essentiall and of the substance of our matter. Wherein if I have eyther omitted any thing pertinent, or admitted ought that is superfluous, I hope, the eye of *Favor* will winck at my missing; as for the *malicious*, seeing I cannot looke for favourable acceptance. I weigh not their verdict: onely as the Poet sayth, *Equitem mihi plaudere cure.*

*The baser sort I care to please no more,
One if I please, enough is me therefore.*

FINIS.